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Trans-Eurasian Land Transport Corridors – 
Assessment of Prospects and Barriers 
Yury Shcherbanin, Anatoli Beifert, Evgeny Vinokurov 
Executive Summary 
• One of the key advantages of economic cooperation at the Greater Eurasian scale is the 
opportunity it presents to significantly increase land transport capacity and the trans-Eurasian 
flows of goods. Raising efficiency of land transport corridors in Greater Eurasia will boost trade 
efficiency and create multiple opportunities for manufacturing and for the establishment of 
various supply chains.  
• The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed by China, aims to provide access to new markets, 
optimal export terms, and further boost the economic development of its remote regions (Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia). 
Among other things, the initiative calls for the building of a network of railways, roads, pipelines, 
and other infrastructure that would link China to Central Asia, West Asia, South Asia, Europe, and 
Africa.  
• For the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a key advantage of continental 
cooperation within the BRI area is the promise of increased transport capacity, which would 
generate a number of positive effects for economic development. The EAEU countries’ transport 
networks would be utilized in a more efficient manner to achieve potential trans-Eurasian links. 
In time, this should lead to better internal connectivity between inner-Eurasian regions (Central 
Asia, Siberia, Urals, and Caucasus). It is particularly important for the EAEU countries to promote 
the development of transport infrastructure in landlocked countries. Of the six EAEU member 
states, five are landlocked.  
• Maritime transport currently dominates trade between China and the EU, accounting for about 
98% of all cargo carried between EU countries and China; air transport accounts for 1.5–2%, and 
railway transport via the EAEU for 0.5–1%. Approximately 80% of EU–China cargoes are carried in 
containers, including about 90% of cargoes brought to the EU from China (imports) and 70–75% 
of cargoes carried from the EU to China (exports). 
• At the same time, over the last four years, cargo flows from China to Europe by rail through the 
EAEU have doubled every year (although from a low base). They reached around 97,000 
containers in 2016. In the opposite direction, from Europe to China, container freight flow in 2016 
also almost doubled, reaching 50,000 containers a year, i.e., 147,000 containers in 2016. To attract 
additional cargo flows, in all countries along the China–EAEU–EU axis, both coordinated 
investment policies and the removal of trade barriers should be implemented. Based on the 
analysis of trade flows and tariff structure, we forecast further growth in EU–China railway cargo 
turnover through the EAEU countries. 
• The discrepancies in regulatory requirements (e.g., length of trains) is one of the most significant 
barriers. The train length laid down by different rail administrations (Deutsche Bahn, Polish 
Railways, Russian Railways, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, the Belarusian Railway, Chinese Railways) 
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depends on factors such as the length of the railway track at the station, train weight, traction 
capacity, route configuration profile, technical capabilities of stages of the railway (rail sidings and 
stations, overpasses and control posts, automatic blockages), shunting conditions at stations, 
technical and technological conditions at intermediate and local stations, sorting, etc. 
• Differences in gauges. Transit operations are hindered by the difference in railway track gauges 
in China and the EU (1435 mm), and in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (1520 mm). This results in 
additional expenses being incurred during cargo transport as wheel pairs need to be changed at 
border crossings; the procedure is also time-consuming, particularly for large freight trains.  
• One of the main barriers to cargo turnover along the China–EAEU–EU axis is the insufficient level 
of procedural harmonization. In most EU countries, railway transport is regulated in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF). At the 
same time, railway administrations in the CIS countries, Baltic States, Iran, China, and Mongolia 
are guided by the Agreement on International Goods Transport by Rail (SMGS). The differences in 
transport law lead to insufficiently harmonized procedures at the cross-border points, and goods 
taking a long time to clear customs and borders.  
• The future of cargo flows depends largely on the development of the Polish railway 
infrastructure and border-crossing points between Belarus and Poland. There is no more 
capacity at the Brest–Małaszewicze border crossing. Moreover, the technical parameters of Polish 
railway infrastructure (length of freight trains, types of platforms needed for the transport of 
containers, maximum allowed weight per axle, maximum allowed speed of freight trains) do not 
permit large container trains to be processed. While the container trains travel through the 
territory of EAEU countries at an average speed of 45 km/h, in Poland they are dramatically slower 
at 18–20 km/h. While the length of freight trains can reach 1050 m in the 1520 mm gauge space, 
they have to be reduced to 600 m in length at Malaszewicze. 
• The Chinese subsidies represent both an opportunity and a systemic risk to trans-Eurasian 
container transit. We estimate that a number of central Chinese provinces subsidize exports at 
an average level of USD2,500 per FEU (40-feet container). According to our estimates, this 
represents approximately 0.3–0.4% of the costs of export: thus, the relative costs are not high. 
However, this subsidy has dramatically improved the economics of land transport to the EU and 
the EAEU. The stability and possible expansion of subsidies is a key issue for the future dynamics 
of transit flows.  
• Trans-border investments in transport infrastructure are unlikely for several reasons: i) the 
White Paper on Transport-2050 clearly articulates the main development priorities and these do 
not assume a significant increase in land transport; ii) the EU is very cautious about the Chinese 
capital or investment flows into European transport projects, referring to the possible risks; iii) 
the EU has consistently distanced itself from investing in Russia’s transport infrastructure projects 
in general and in transit in particular; iv) while China invests heavily in the EAEU oil, gas, and mining 
industries, it has so far provided zero FDI in the transport sector.  
Our conclusion is that large-scale investments in transport corridors will probably remain subject 
to domestic efforts. A survey of 30 EU companies (exporters, transport, and logistics companies) 
carried out as part of the project strongly confirmed these conclusions.  
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• The survey conducted in the framework of the study also shows that one of the main risk factors 
is the cumbersome regulations and various non-tariff barriers in China. These mean extra 
challenges for EU companies if they pursue the opportunity of EU–China transport corridors. A 
factor frequently mentioned by European companies is the low quality of transport, customs, and 
logistics infrastructure in transit countries. However, although transport experts normally point 
to the long drawn-out customs procedures, inspections, and official procedures of border 
clearance of transported cargo, according to the survey this factor appears to be insignificant. 
Such factors as specific regulations within the bilateral intergovernmental agreements also appear 
to be insignificant for the assessment of trans-Eurasian transport corridor perspectives. 
• We suggest of number of recommendations, including:  
- International coordination of the development of land transport corridors, including 
coordination of investment policies (details in the report).  
- Investments in infrastructural bottlenecks. We identify three of them:  
(1) border crossings (China–Russia, China–Kazakhstan, Belarus–Poland);  
(2) logistics hubs in the EAEU countries;  
(3) Polish railway infrastructure.  
- Regulatory convergence wherever feasible (details in the report).  
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Structure and Methodology 
This report comprises a main report plus Annex. 
Section 1 provides the executive summary. 
Section 2 outlines the overall structure of the report and describes the methodology used by the study 
team and the data collection approach. 
Section 3 provides analysis of cargo flows between EU, EAEU countries, and the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and a quantitative assessment of prospects for cargo turnover along the China–EAEU–EU 
axis  
Section 4 analyzes existing barriers to the development of international freight transport and transit 
along the China–EAEU–EU axis 
Section 5 identifies the potential interest of EU countries in increasing trans-Eurasian overland transit 
and of EU investors in transport-infrastructural projects in China and the EAEU.  
Innovation and significance of the study 
The innovative methodology used for the data collection in the study is based on secondary and 
primary data analysis, including desktop research, personal interviews, and online questionnaire. The 
target groups of the study are: 
• Transport related public/governmental authorities in Europe, China and transit countries (e.g., 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, etc.); 
• Transport- and/or logistics-related service providers, including integrators, transport associations 
and logistics-related umbrella organizations with their operational area mainly in Europe and 
China; 
• Importing/exporting business companies; 
• Transport- and logistics-related research organizations. 
This innovative characteristic of the study’s methodology means that the findings reflect the 
viewpoints of all stakeholders concerned, thus helping to enable a more comprehensive and holistic 
standpoint at the EU policy level. Although the survey has limitations, the online survey results were 
useful for assessing potentials and barriers, and also the willingness of relevant stakeholders to invest 
in the transport infrastructure of an EU–China land transport corridor in the future.  
Study limitations 
Information included in the country profiles was collected from primary and secondary sources. 
Findings from the survey will be used as indicative and not for generalization, as the sample applied 
may not be representative at the global scale of the EU–China Land Transport Corridor. 
Stakeholder interviews 
To support the goals of the study, a number of stakeholder groups were identified, and selected 
stakeholders were approached for an interview, based on a structured script and/or semi-structured 
interviews (personal, telephone, and via Skype1 interviews). 
                                                          
1Software application for video and audio calls. Further information: www.skype.com  
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On-line survey  
A comprehensive web-based survey was prepared in English and can be accessed at: 
https://ru.surveymonkey.com/r/DD6BSJK (English version) 
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Cargo Flow Analysis between the EU, China, and the EAEU 
Commodity flows volume and dynamics between the EАЕU and China (including 
nominal values and physical volumes) 
By the end of 2016 the volume of commodity flows between the EАEU and China had reached a 10-
year maximum of approximately 130 million tons shipped along this route annually. The nominal value 
of shipments, however, is still small on the global scale (though it has increased 1.5-fold during the 
last decade). The positive dynamics of commodity shipment between the EАEU countries and China 
result from a growth of 75% in Eurasian Economic Union exports to China (the export commodity 
volume in 2016 reached 117 million tons). Import volumes from China to the EAEU are much smaller 
than exports (about 15 million tons annually) and they are not growing. 
Fuel dominates the structure of Eurasian Economic Union exports to China (in terms of physical 
volume). Its share doubled during the past decade and reached 65% in 2016; at the same time the 
volume of shipment (in tons) tripled. Most of the exports in this group are oil (in 2016, 47.6 million 
tons were exported from Russia to China, and 3.2 million tons from Kazakhstan) and coal (16 million 
tons exported from Russia). Shipment volumes of petroleum products, natural gas, and other fuels 
have been much smaller. 
About 15% of total EАEU exports to China are timber and lumber shipped from Russia (about 20 
million tons in 2016). The share of minerals and chemicals had decreased to 10.6% in 2016 (compared 
to a 20% share earlier). This can be explained by decreased exports of iron ore (both from Russia and 
Kazakhstan) as a result of the fall in global iron ore prices. A significant share of EАEU exports to China 
is mineral fertilizers (4–5%, exported from Russia and Belarus), while shares of all other commodities 
is significantly lower. 
The import structure for commodities coming from China into the EАEU is much more diverse. 25–
30% of its volume is machinery and equipment, 15% is metals and metal products, 10% each chemical 
products, construction materials, and food and agricultural products; and 6–8% each minerals and 
chemicals; and clothes, shoes, and textiles. The shares of all other commodity groups are insignificant. 
The growth in total trade volume and cargo shipment between the EАEU and China is creating a 
platform for the development of container cargo flows, in which case export flows will be more 
diversified and will include products that can be shipped in containers. 
Analysis of commodity freight traffic between the EAEU and China (relevant to 
each member state of the EAEU) and its dynamics (including container flows) 
Russia has the main share of the flows between the EАEU and China (75% of total import commodity 
flows and over 90% of export commodity outflows. Russia previously had about 75-80% of export 
outflows). In second place is Kazakhstan, but its share of export outflows has decreased from 20–25% 
to less than 10%, and in terms of import commodity flows, from 20–15%. Belarus has about 2% of 
both import and export commodity flows between the EAEU and China. Kyrgyzstan’s share of EAEU 
imports from China is about 5%. Armenia’s is about 1%; the share of these countries in export outflows 
to China is insignificant (about 0.1%). 
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Commodity flows between Russia and China 
The structure of export commodity freight flows from Russia to China is, in general, almost identical 
to the structure of export freight flows to China from the EAEU (as Russia dominates the export 
outflows of the EAEU to China). Two-thirds of the total export volume from Russia to China in 2016 
was fuel (its export volume was 4.7 times bigger than in 2007, while the share of exports increased 
2.4-fold). About 15-20% of exports is timber and timber products (the share of this type of export has 
decreased twice due to the fall in roundwood exports). The share of mineral raw materials (consisting 
mainly of iron ore) has halved: from 15–20% to 8–10%; another 3–5% of export outflows consist of 
potassium and mixed mineral fertilizers. All the other types of export commodities are insignificant, 
including agricultural products and cellulose/paper. 
The structure of export outflows from Russia to China is dominated by commodities that cannot be 
shipped in containers (fuel, raw materials, mineral fertilizers, timber, and agricultural raw materials), 
thus leading to the low proportion of container shipments (2–2.5%, according to Russian export 
statistics). In the last decade, the physical volume of Russian container shipments to China (almost 2.4 
million tons in 2015) increased significantly (2.5-fold). Nevertheless, the increase in the share of this 
outflow in total export freight flow was only 0.5%—down from 2%–2.5%. The fact remains that 
container shipments are steadily increasing, allowing an optimistic prognosis about container export 
outflow growth in the transport and logistics infrastructure-development sector in Russia and the 
EAEU. 
Import commodity flows from China to Russia match the entire China–EAEU inflow: equipment 
accounts for 25-30% of total supply; metals and metal products for about 15%; chemicals, agricultural, 
mineral raw materials, and construction products, account for about 10% each, while all the other 
commodity groups’ shares are insignificant. 
The share of Russian import container flow increased from 45-50% to 55-60% between 2007 and 2016, 
and the physical volume of container shipments increased from 4.5–5 to 5.5–7 million tons annually. 
The structure of container imports from China to Russia defines the growing level of containerization 
of import commodity flows.  
Commodity flow between Kazakhstan and China 
The structure of Kazakhstan exports to China (in tons shipped) is close to the export commodity 
outflow structure of Russia. The main commodity that Kazakhstan ships to China is fuel (mainly crude 
oil, but in 2016 also natural gas), which makes up half of national exports. Still, unlike Russia, the 
second significant commodity group shipped from Kazakhstan to China is “mineral and chemical raw 
materials” (up to 15 million tons—metal ores and sulfur), which account for 25–40% of export 
outflows (more than 50% in some years). The third group of commodities shipped to China is metal 
products (ferrochrome, copper, and steel), which account for to 5–10% of total Kazakh exports to 
China. At the same time, timber or mineral fertilizers are rarely found in Kazakh export outflows. 
Imports from China to Kazakhstan are relatively low (2–3 million tons annually) and mainly consist of 
equipment (about 25% of total imports), metal products (about 20%), chemicals and construction 
materials (10–15%). The volumes of shipments of other products vary. 
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Commodity flow between Belarus and China 
The basis of Belarus exports to China are potassium mineral fertilizers (89–90% of total exports, about 
1–2 million tons annually). Roundwood and chemicals (polyamides) are also present in commodity 
export outflows from Belarus. 
In return, Belarus imports a small volume of commodities (about 0.5 million tons annually), consisting 
mainly of equipment and machinery (about 35%) and metal products (15–20%). 
Commodity flow between Armenia and China 
The physical volume of export and import operations between Armenia and China are insignificant: 
exports and imports are about 100,000 tons annually. Exports are dominated by mineral raw materials 
(copper ore); imports consist of equipment, machinery, metal products, and construction materials. 
Commodity flow between Kyrgyzstan and China 
The volume of Kyrgyzstan’s exports to China is also insignificant—about 100,000 tons annually, 
dominated by two commodity groups: fuel (coal); and textiles and leather, which make up to 80% of 
the export outflow. 
The import structure is diverse. Of 600,000–700,000 tons annually, Kyrgyzstan imports 10–20% of 
total volume of each the following groups of commodities: agricultural products and raw materials; 
clothes, shoes, and textiles; machinery and equipment; and metals and metal products.  
Overall, commodity export outflow from the EAEU to China consists of non-container goods; the share 
of container shipments is about 1.5–2% (2–2.5 million tons annually). This is the result of the export 
structure being dominated by non-container commodities (fuel, mineral raw materials, timber, 
mineral fertilizers, and agricultural raw materials).  
The share of container shipments from China to the EAEU has significantly increased over the past 
decade: from 35% to 55%, while the physical volume has grown from less than 6 million tons annually 
to 7–9 million tons. Container-shipped commodities, the share of which is steadily increasing, 
dominate the import commodity inflow structure, unlike the export structure.  
Overview of cargo shipment volume trends in the EAEU (railway and road 
transport) 
An overview of Russia–China shipment volume dynamics (railway transport) 
According to Russian international trade statistics, Russian exports transported by rail to China have 
decreased to about 24 million tons annually (about 30 million tons in 2011–2013) due to the decreased 
volume of iron ore exports. Railway is mainly used to ship significant volumes of mineral and chemical 
raw materials (iron ore, sulfur, etc.), namely, 6–11 million tons annually, along with mineral fertilizers 
(about 2 million tons annually), fuel (mainly coal, about 1.8 million tons annually), and cellulose and 
paper industry products (0.9 million tons annually).  
These data match statistics presented by Russian Railways on export commodity shipments to China. 
At the same time the figures include not only direct shipments to China, but also shipment to maritime 
ports where commodities are loaded on to ships (for destinations in the eastern and south-eastern 
seaboard provinces), in other words, multimodal shipments. The commodity structure in this case is 
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dominated by timber and timber products (including cellulose and paper industry goods), fuels (coal 
and oil products), and mineral fertilizers and ore. 
According to Russian statistics on international trade, only 1% of Russian exports by rail to China is 
shipped in containers (150,000–200,000 tons annually). Cellulose and paper- industry products, 
timber, and chemical raw materials dominate container shipments. Russian Railways transport 
statistics include multimodal shipments (railway/maritime and railway/road) in the volume of exports 
via railway along with the weight of the containers themselves, thus indicating higher level (2–4%) of 
container export share in total exports. The export structure of Russian Railways is dominated by 
timber and timber products (including cellulose and paper-industry products) and so-called “other 
products,” which include chemicals, machinery, and equipment). 
An analysis of official Russian Railways statistics indicates that the volume of TEU container exports 
from Russia to China has increased 2.5-fold during the last 7 years (from 69,000 TEU in 2010 to 171,000 
TEU in 2016). At the same time, just 10–20% of commodity exports pass through customs on the inland 
border between Russia and China (21,000 TEU in 2016) while the majority of commodities are shipped 
on directly by rail and maritime routes as multimodal shipments. Almost all container cargo trains 
cross the border at Zabaikalsk (80–100% of the total inland railway shipments), but the importance of 
this border crossing is decreasing. The other major border-crossing point is Grodekovo (in 2016 its 
share increased to 18% of total inland exports). All the other customs points are almost empty, 
including those on the border between Kazakhstan and China. As for the contents of shipments, 93–
99% of inland export outflows were “other commodities” up to 2015–2016; in 2016 half of exports 
became timber and timber products, and the other half continued to be “other commodities.”  
The short- and mid-term perspectives of Russian exports to China are related to the commodity group 
“84 TN–Machinery and equipment” (in the statistical databases developed by Russian Railways this 
type of commodity is included in “other commodities”). Currently, both the volume of shipment and 
its share of total exports are insignificant; but they have growth potential, in terms of developing 
Russian-Chinese industrial collaboration in the future. 
Russian imports from China by rail represent about 2 million tons annually (according to Russian 
statistics bureau). 25% of this volume is machinery and equipment (0.4–0.6 million tons annually), 15–
20% is in i) metal products and ii) construction materials, and iii) 10% each is in chemical products, 
fuel, minerals, and chemical raw materials.  
The statistical bulletin of Russian Railways indicates that the volume of shipment is double the figure 
mentioned above: this is a state corporation and it includes both multimodal shipments and the 
weight of containers in the volumes of shipments. According to these statistics, 75% of total import 
shipments to Russia are “other commodities,” including machinery and equipment, chemical products, 
food, etc.), and about 10% are metal products and 10% construction materials. 
The increased share of container railway transport in the volume of Russian imports from China (which 
has increased to 60%, according to Russian Railways statistics) has extra growth potential. (For 
comparison, 100% of goods from Germany are shipped to China in containers). This growth potential 
is especially high for the “other goods” which are usually shipped in containers. Though in 2015–2016 
container imports from China were insignificant, they do show a potential for exponential growth in 
volume in the mid-term.  
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According to the Russian Railways statistical bulletin, the level of import container shipment from 
China in the past years ranges from 200,000 to 250,000 TEU annually; and just 25% of this volume 
crosses the inland border (55,000 TEU in 2016). The majority of container cargo transported by rail is 
shipped to China via maritime ports (multimodal shipment). Almost all imports from China (and to 
China) cross the customs border in Zabaikalsk (90–98%) and Dostyk (the share of this border-crossing 
point increased in 2016 to 9%). Cargo shipment via other inland border-crossing points is currently 
insignificant. 95% of this volume is made of “other commodities,” and about 1,000 TEU annually are 
“mineral and construction materials”. 
General trends in the volume of transport by road between the EAEU and the EU 
The volume of Russian exports to China via regular roads (automobile transport) tripled between 2008 
and 2015, but still is relatively small (about 1.2 million tons annually). Most of these shipments are of 
timber (roundwood and timber products), which occupy 60–70% of shipment volume (this decreased 
to 50% in 2015). At the same time the share of agricultural raw materials shipped increased 
significantly in 2015 (from 10–15% to 40%). Other types of commodities are rarely shipped to China 
by road. 
It is almost impossible to find container shipments by road from Russia to China (a few thousand tons 
are shipped this way, mainly metal products and agricultural products). The share of container 
shipment by road ranges from 1% to 3%.  
According to Russian international trade statistics, the volume of Russian imports from China 
(transported by road) is around 1.5–2 million tons annually. The main commodity groups for this type 
of shipment are: food and agricultural raw materials (30–50%), machinery and equipment (25–30%), 
and clothes, shoes, and textiles (about 10%).  
30% of cargo shipped by road transport are containerized. This includes Chinese machinery and 
equipment, and also chemicals being shipped to Russia (50–60% of total import inflows by road to 
Russia); clothes, shoes, and textiles (30–40%), and agricultural raw materials (1–2%).  
General trends in the development of traffic volumes by rail and road between other 
EAEU countries and China 
According to Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (Kazakhstan national railways), Kazakhstan exports by rail to 
China are increasing, along with growing capacity at the border-crossing points, Dostyk-Alashankou 
and Altynkol-Khorgos, where there is a current volume of about 4.7 million tons per year. The export 
commodity structure includes mineral raw materials (sulfur, ferrous and non-ferrous metals), metal 
products (ferrochromium), fuel (liquid natural gas [LNG]) and agricultural raw materials (grain). The 
share of containerized cargo from Kazakhstan to China is about 15%, dominated by ferro-composites 
and non-ferrous metals. Kazakhstan has a clear logistical comparative advantage in terms of the supply 
of ferrochrome to the Chinese metal industry. There is thus a basis for growth in the containerized 
cargo flow of ferrochrome along the Kazakhstan–China railway route if demand from China increases. 
With container cargo currently focused primarily on machinery and equipment, chemical products, 
etc., it is unlikely that container export of commodities by rail will to increase mid-term.  
The volume of Kazakhstan's railway imports from China (along with total imports) has decreased in 
the past years and, in nominal terms, constituted less than 1.5 million tons in 2016. This can be 
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attributed to the decline of demand for imported products in Kazakhstan, driven by a significant 
reduction of global prices for and export revenues from, the country’s key export commodities. The 
structure of Kazakhstan’s imports from China by rail mainly includes machinery and metal products, 
and chemical products; at the same time, imports of petrochemicals have decreased. The fact that the 
prices of Kazakhstan’s main export products have now stabilized allows the growth of imports of 
machinery and equipment and household appliances to be predicted, which points to increasing 
container import inflows. 
An analysis of the foreign trade and transport statistics in the EU, EAEU, and Belarus indicates that 
almost 100% of Belarus's exports to China are multimodal (railway and maritime transport) and are 
routed via the Baltic States ports (1–2 million tons annually). The exports are dominated by mineral 
fertilizers and roundwood, which is why container cargo has an insignificant share of (about 1–2%). 
Container exports are dominated by chemical products and equipment. Belarus’s export transit via 
railway in Russia and Kazakhstan is currently insignificant (6–8 thousand tons annually according to 
Russian Railways statistics) and consists mainly of “other commodities” shipped in containers (over 
80% in 2016). 
Belarusian imports from China are also mainly multimodal (railway–maritime and road– maritime 
transport) via the Baltic States ports. According to Russian Railways, Belarus imports by rail from China 
increased significantly in 2016 exceeding 60,000 tons which is almost 10% of the total imports from 
China to Belarus. The import structure is dominated by the “other goods" shipped in containers, which 
make up about 85% of the volume.  
The volume of the railway exports from Kyrgyzstan to China is currently insignificant and dominated 
by coal and precious metals. This volume is limited by the network capacity of Kazakhstan railway at 
border-crossing points of Dostyk-Alashankou and Altynkol-Khorgos, which already fully in service to 
Kazakhstan. Railway imports to Kyrgyzstan from China are also insignificant: the volume does not 
exceed 100,000 tons annually; imports are mainly machinery and equipment, metal, and chemical 
products.  
Exports and imports between Armenia and China are non-existent according to Russian Railways 
statistics. 
The volume of Kazakhstan’s exports to China by road is about 50,000 tons annually and is dominated 
by agricultural raw materials. The reverse import flow is relatively small (about 100,000 tons annually) 
and is dominated by clothes, shoes and textiles, food, and construction materials.  
There are currently no imports and exports by road between Belarus and China.  
Exports from Kyrgyzstan to China by road do not exceed 50,000 tons annually and are dominated by 
agricultural raw materials. The volume of the reverse import flow is about 100, 000tons per year, and 
includes clothes, shoes, textiles, food, and construction materials.  
There are currently no imports and exports by road between Armenia and China.  
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EU-China commodity flow structure 
Overview of commodity structure, volumes of trade and its dynamics in value and 
physical dimensions between EU countries and China 
Despite the large volumes of mutual trade between the EU and China (which recently stabilized at the 
level of USD560–600 billion annually), the physical volume of these operations is relatively small 
(about 90–110 million tons annually). The volume of EU imports from China over the past 5 years was 
approximately double that of exports in value terms and also approximately double in nominal terms, 
while the physical volume was about 25–40% higher. Nevertheless, the trade imbalance between the 
two is declining (especially in terms of physical volume). This tendency is considered positive, as it 
leads to a significant decrease in empty containers flowing from EU countries, something that was 
experienced by the parties over the past years. 
The structure of EU exports to China in physical volumes is diverse and includes cellulose and paper-
industry products (about 25% of total physical volume, mainly waste paper), mineral and chemical 
raw materials (10–20%), machinery and chemical products (8–12%), agricultural raw materials (3%), 
fuel (15-20%), metal products (7%), and timber (8%). The structure of EU imports is dominated by 
machinery, equipment, and industry products (35%), metal products (15–20%), construction materials 
(7–10%), clothes, shoes, and textiles (9%), chemical products (9%), mineral and chemical raw materials 
(7%). The share of other commodity groups is much lower. 
China's largest trading partners in Europe (in terms of physical volume) are currently Germany, United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands, followed by Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland. Statistical data 
indicate that 98% of both exports and imports is shipped by sea, 1.5–2% by air, and 0.5–1% by rail.2 
Analysis of the commodity structure of freight flows transported by rail and road 
between EU countries and China (allocation of container cargo) 
The turnover in EU–China trade by rail almost doubled from 400,000–600,000 tons in 2006 to 1 million 
tons in 2016. The volume shipped by air increased 1.5-fold (from 1.2–1.4 to 1.8–1.9 million tons), and 
maritime transport increased by 10–15%.  
The fact that export volumes from the EU to China by rail have doubled over the past decade (reaching 
400,000 tons in 2016) results from the railway shipment of cars and auto parts, and machinery and 
equipment (engines, transmissions, pumps, etc.); at the same time, machinery now represents half of 
the rail trade volume. Approximately 15–20% of European railway export to China is "metals and metal 
products"(the 2006 volume doubled to almost 70,000 tons in 2016). About 10% of railway cargo is 
chemical products; timber products also play a significant role (approximately 5–8% of trade volume). 
According to Russian Railways statistics, all EU–China transit is shipped in containers.  
The structure of EU railway imports from China consists of 55% in machinery and equipment, 10–15% 
in metal products (the share is decreasing), 5–10% in minerals and chemical raw materials, chemical 
products, construction materials, clothes, shoes, and textiles, while the share of other import groups 
                                                          
2According to EuroStat about 5% of import volumes and 1.5-3% of export deliveries between EU countries and 
China are serviced by road transport, but these volumes are in fact multimodal when road transport is used 
exclusively to transport commodities from ports to temporary storage warehouses or bonded warehouses 
(under DDU/DDP Incoterms) or reverse (under FCA Incoterms). The main delivery is implemented by maritime 
transport. According to the Eurostat Transport Database, there is no road cargo transport between the EU 
countries and China 
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is low. Approximately 80% of multimodal maritime-railway cargo between the EU and China is 
containerized: this represents 90% of EU imports and 70–75% of EU exports. 
Container turnover between the EU and China is steadily increasing and now exceeds 12 million TEU 
annually (as a result of increasing container shipments from China, which are 1.5–2 times higher than 
the counter flow). China’s main counterparts in the container trade are Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands, which together form about 60% of the total Sino–European container turnover. 
For example, Germany's freight container turnover with China is 98% of total turnover, including 100% 
of the commodities imported by Germany from China, and approximately 95% of cargo outflow from 
Germany. 
The 80% containerization level achieved in trade between the EU and China is due to containerization 
of maritime trade.  
Russian Railways statistics on transit container railway deliveries from the EU to China show an 
exponential growth in railway shipments, from 1,300 TEU in 2010 to over 50,000 TEU in 2016. While 
up to 2014 almost all (95–100%) transit container freight traffic crossed the customs border at 
Zabaykalsk, in 2016 the share of this crossing decreased to 22%. Two-thirds of containers (about 
34,000 TEU are now crossing the border at Dostyk, and another 5,300 TEU are crossing at Naushki. 
More than 95% of container cargo from the EU to China is commodities, referred as “other 
commodities.”  
The transit container freight flow from China to the EU increased from 5,600 TEU in 2010 to almost 
100,000 TEU in 2016 and is twice as big as the counter-flow trade. Shipment volumes via border-
crossing points are the same as EU–China transit volumes: the share of Dostyk has increased from 1% 
to 67%, and that of Zabaikalsk has decreased from 99% to 20% (while the volume of container cargo 
increased 3.5-fold during this time). Cross-border shipment also increased at Naushki (8% in 2016) and 
Altynkol (5%). Again, almost all container cargo is commodities, referred as “other commodities”.  
The dominance of container cargo along the route analyzed indicates growth potential for railway 
cargo transport from the EU to China and back in the coming years. 
Brief analysis of cargo structure and dynamics between the EU and the EAEU 
(including container shipment). The main trends for each EAEU member state 
EU–EAEU export and import structure and dynamics analysis (nominal values and 
physical volumes) 
Though the European Union is rapidly developing economic collaboration with the countries from 
Asia-Pacific Region, the EAEU remains its most significant trading partner, both in terms of the physical 
and nominal values of shipments. The trade turnover between the EAEU and the EU is 550–575 million 
tons annually, and this figure has been stable from 2007–2016. The nominal value of foreign trade 
ranges from USD240 to 460 billion annually due to volatility of raw materials prices during this period. 
Exports from the EAEU countries to the EU significantly exceed imports: twice in nominal terms and 
20–30 times in physical volume. The physical volume of EAEU exports to the EU has increased by 5–
10%, from 510–530 million tons to 557 million tons annually during the past decade, while the nominal 
values has decreased from over USD300 billion to 155 billion in 2016. At the same time imports 
decreased both in physical values (from 30 to less than 20 million tons), and in nominal values (from 
USD100–150 billion to USD80 billion). 
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On the other hand, the import container inflow from the EU to EAEU countries, which has declined in 
the past 5 years due to both the dramatic decrease of EAEU countries export income from export and 
to the economic sanctions imposed by EU countries on Russia, has the potential to be restored to the 
pre-2014 level if there is no force majeure, thus leading to increased volume of container shipments. 
As the volume of container imports is currently relatively small (partly due to the under-developed 
logistics infrastructure in EAEU countries), container inflow to the EAEU has a great potential for 
increase. 
EAEU exports to the EU are dominated by different types of fuel, which occupies 85–90% of the total 
export volume (450–490 million tons annually). For the other commodity groups, there are significant 
export volumes to the EU countries of mineral raw materials, timber, and metal products (about 15 
million tons annually or 3–4% of the total exports) while all the other commodity exports are 
insignificant. 
EAEU imports from the EU are dominated by chemical products, machinery and equipment, and 
agricultural products (3–5 million tons annually), each category taking up 15–20% of total import 
volume. Other commodity group imports do not exceed 10%.  
The main export and import cargo flows between the EU and EAEU are generated by Russia, which 
provides 80–90% of all export and import volume between all EAEU countries. Kazakhstan provides 
about 10% of export and 5% of import volumes, Belarus 4–5% of exports and about 10% of imports. 
(In the last three years its share has grown to 11–14% due to the re-export of agricultural products 
from the EU to Russia). Armenia and Kyrgyzstan both provide about 0.5–1% of EAEU imports and 
almost zero in exports. The main EAEU trade partners in the EU (according to Eurostat) are Germany 
(about 20% of the physical volume in exports and imports), the Netherlands (11–14%), Italy (about 
10%) and Poland (about 9%); among other significant trade partners in the EU are Finland, France, and 
the United Kingdom (approximately 5% each). 
Analysis of commodity flow structure and dynamics between the EAEU and the EU 
(relevant to EAEU member states) and its dynamics (including container cargo) 
Russian exports to the EU are dominated by fuel, which makes up about 90% of total exports (over 
420 million tons in 2016). Crude oil, oil products, and natural gas dominate Russia’s export structure, 
followed by a significant outflow of charcoal. Of the other 10% of exports, the main commodities are 
mineral raw materials and metal products (3–4% of total export) and timber (2%). The share of all 
other export products is insignificant. 
The share of Russian container cargo exports to the EU is insignificant and does not exceed 1% 
(although it did increase from 0.4% to 0.6%). This is due to the complete dominance of large-tonnage 
cargo not intended to be shipped in containers (crude oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore, roundwood, 
mineral fertilizers, grain, and other agricultural raw materials, etc.).  
The structure of Russian imports from the European Union is significantly smaller and yet much more 
diverse: about 15–20% of imports (per each of the three categories) are machines and equipment, 
chemical products, and mineral and chemical raw materials. Due to Russian countersanctions imposed 
on the EU in 2014, the share of agricultural raw materials decreased to less than 10%. A significant 
share of imports (5–10%) were food, cellulose and paper-industry products, chemical products, metal 
products, and construction materials.  
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The share of container cargo for Russian imports from the EU is 20–25%, or about 4–6 million tons of 
container shipments annually.  
Kazakhstan's exports to the EU are dominated by fuel (mainly crude oil). This reached 98% in 2013-
2016, while all the other export products became insignificant in terms of the country’s exports to 
Europe. For comparison, in 2007–2008 about 5% of Kazakhstan's exports to the EU were metal 
products, mainly ferrochrome and copper.  
Kazakhstan’s imports from the EU are relatively small (about 1 million tons annually), and consist of 
machinery and equipment (20–30% of total import volume), chemical products (15–20%), agricultural 
raw materials (the share increased from 5 to 25%) and metal products (10–15%). 
Of Belarus's exports to the EU, 75% belonged to 2 commodity groups: fuel (mainly petroleum products, 
the share of which decreased from 70 to 50% during the last decade) and timber (the share of which 
increased from 10% to almost 30% in the last decade). Significant Belarusian exports to the EU include 
mineral fertilizers (potassium), metal products, and mineral raw materials (4-8% per each commodity 
group). 
The structure of Belarus imports from the EU has changed significantly in the last three years: the 
share of agricultural raw materials has doubled (probably due to the re-export of European products 
following Russian countersanctions). At the same time, the share of imports is declining: the share of 
machinery and equipment decreased from 15–20% to less than 10%, chemical products, from 20–15%, 
and timber, from 10–1%. Moreover, Belarus has been importing more mineral raw materials 
(limestone, cement) from the EU lately: the share of these products has increased from 10–15%. 
Exports from Armenia to the EU are not significant (100,000–200,000 tons annually) and are 
dominated by mineral raw materials (copper and zinc ores); the share of these doubled in the last 
decade and reached 80%. The second most significant exports are metal exports (copper, aluminum), 
but their share has decreased from 40-50% to 15–20%. No commodity groups are exported on a 
regular basis. 
Armenia's imports from the EU are equally small (200,000 to 400,000 tons annually) and have declined 
over the last 3 years. There are two main commodities: fuel (oil products) and agricultural raw 
materials, which together form 40–70% of the import volume. 
The main export commodities from Kyrgyzstan to the EU are quite small (20,000–30,000 tons 
annually) and mainly include dried beans and non-ferrous scrap metal. 
Imports to Kyrgyzstan from the EU (which declined in 2016 to less than 50,000 tons) are much more 
diverse. The most significant categories are machinery (mainly cars), chemical products, and timber. 
The share of container cargo in EAEU exports to the EU is insignificant and is less than 1% (between 
2007 and 2016 it ranged from 0.5% to 0.9%). The reason is as described above: the majority of 
commodities shipped from the EAEU (mainly Russia and Kazakhstan) cannot be containerized (oil, 
natural gas, coal, iron ore, grain, etc.) and only insignificant shares of other products are shipped in 
containers.  
Container cargo represents 20–25% of the total import volume to the EAEU countries from the 
European Union. The physical volume of these shipments fell from 5.5–7 million tons annually in 
2007–2014 to 4.5–5 million tons in 2015–2016.  
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The structure of EAEU–EU trade is defined by the commodity structure of their international trade 
supply. Fuel and mineral raw materials dominate EAEU exports to the EU and thus define the 
dominance of maritime and pipeline transport in EAEU exports to the EU. The share of maritime 
shipments in the last 5 years has been 54–57% of the total turnover volume, and the share of pipelines 
(oil, gas, and product pipelines) is 30–31%. Approximately 7–8% of exports from EAEU countries to 
the EU are moved by rail and only 2–3% by road. 
The main mode of transport for EAEU imports from the EU is by road, and its share has increased from 
55% to 60–65% in the past decade. The volume of road-transported cargo is stable: about 15 million 
tons annually. Approximately 25–30% of cargo is shipped by maritime transport. The share of railway 
transport decreased by half from 16–17% in 2006-2008 to 8.5% in 2016. The use of road transport 
along this trade route is due to the high shipment share of machinery, equipment, and chemical 
products, which are relatively small and thus easily shipped by road (the volume of single-unit 
shipments is also quite small). The double to triple decrease in railway imports can be explained by 
import structure changes: the Russian embargo on food imports from the EU countries (which were 
normally delivered to Russia by rail, especially from Poland) led to a significant decrease in this type 
of import and hence to a decrease in cargo volume. 
Analysis of cargo volume development trends in EAEU member states, including different 
types of transport (railway and road) 
General cargo volume development trends in railway transport between the EAEU and the 
EU  
The turnover in railway trade between the EAEU and the EU had significantly decreased by 2009, and 
gradually decreased by 25% up to 2014, when it was 38 million tons annually. Of this volume, exports 
are about 10–20 times higher than imports. 
According to Eurostat, the volume of railway exports from the EAEU to the European Union has 
decreased by almost 10 million tons (to 36.6 million tons) during the past decade (though in the last 
3 years, they have had a positive trend). 35–40% of this volume is fuel (in 2013-2016, 12–13 million 
tons annually, mainly Russian coal and Russian and Belarusian oil products). About 30% of are mineral 
and chemical raw materials (8–11 million tons annually, mainly Russian iron ore and alcohol). A feature 
of recent years has been the increased volume of timber exports (8.3 million tons in 2016) and how 
the share of timber in railway cargo shipment to the EU has risen by 23% due to exports of Russian 
roundwood and Belarus fuel timber. The other growing exports to the EU are Russian and Belarusian 
mineral fertilizers (2.5 million tons annually and up to 7% of freight volume). The export of metal 
products (Russian and Belarusian steel) has declined by almost 50% to 1.5 million tons annually (3–4% 
of total export volume). Exports of agricultural raw materials grew by up to 0.5 million tons annually 
during the same time period and now represent 1.5% of total export volume.  
The volume of other commodity trades is relatively low, and does not exceed 100,000 tons annually. 
Railway imports from the European Union to the EAEU decreased three-fold over the past decade, 
dropping to 1.6 million tons in 2016. At the same time, the share of mineral raw material imports 
(dominated by cement exported to Belarus and Russia, and limestone exported to Belarus) increased 
to 35–40% despite a decrease in physical volume. 11–15% of EU exports are machinery, equipment, 
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and industry products, while the share of all other commodities is insignificant and varies significantly 
year on year.  
According to Eurostat, the volume of Russian railway exports to the EU reduced significantly in 2009, 
but in 2013-2016 stabilized at the level of 23–27 million tons annually. 90% of this volume comes from 
three major groups: fuel (about 40%, dominated by coal and oil products), mineral and chemical raw 
materials (35%, dominated by iron ore) and timber (15%); another 3–6% from mineral fertilizers and 
metal products. The share of other commodity groups is insignificant. 
According to Russian Railways statistics, the export structure is responsible for the low share of 
container cargo, which is about 1–2% of total volume. The only significant share (10–20%) is that of 
chemical products.  
Imports to Russia from the EU countries by rail is low and continues to decrease for almost all types 
of imports (in total: from over 3 million tons to about 1 million tons in 2016). Major imports to Russia 
by rail are mineral raw materials (30–40%), machinery and equipment (15–20%), and chemical 
products (about 10%).  
According to Russian Railways statistics, the share of container imports to Russia is gradually 
increasing, growing from 10% to 20% in the past decade. Such growth is represented by a significant 
decrease in the shipment of non-metal construction materials from the Baltic States, which were 
mainly shipped by rail. 
According to Eurostat, the volume of Kazakhstan's exports by rail decreased two-fold during the past 
decade: from 2–2.5 million tons to about 1.1 million tons in 2016. The share of fuels still dominates 
Kazakhstan exports (75–80%), though the volume of shipment decreased by half and metal products 
exports have almost stopped. Kazakhstan's mineral raw material exports (mainly sulfur) are about 
200,000 tons annually, while their share has increased to 15–20%.  
As in case of Russia, the share of container cargo exported by Kazakhstan to the EU is insignificant, 
mainly due to the type of products exported. 
Kazakhstan imports from the EU have decreased fourfold over the past decade to less than 200,000 
tons, due to decreased income from fuel exports. The share of products that can be shipped in 
containers: machinery, equipment and timber, decreased threefold (to 10%) while railway imports of 
agricultural products increased both in terms of share (to 30%) and physical volume.  
The share of container cargo in Kazakhstan's imports by rail is relatively low and is estimated at 10%. 
According to Eurostat, the volume of Belarus’s exports to the EU by rail has increased 1.5-fold over 
the past decade, reaching 8.6 million tons. The overall growth in export volume results from increased 
timber shipment (non-container roundwood and fuel timber) and a relevant increased share of these 
products (50%). Shares of mineral raw materials and fertilizers remained stable (10–15%), while shares 
of fuels (oil products) decreased from 35% to 15%. This stable export structure means a low level of 
container shipments (5%). 
Imports to Belarus by rail are much lower than exports, representing 0.3–0.5 million tons annually. 
Imports mainly consist of non-containerized mineral raw materials (limestone, cement), which occupy 
about 80% of imports. The share of container shipment in Belarus from the EU is estimated at around 
10–15%. 
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Kyrgyz exports to the EU by rail are insignificant (1,000–2,000 tons annually) and mainly include dried 
beans, which are not containerized. 
Kyrgyz imports from the EU by rail have always been relatively small, and have declined significantly 
in the last two years (to 12,000 tons in 2016); they mainly comprise agricultural raw materials, timber, 
etc. 
Export and import cargo flows between Armenia and the EU countries are insignificant and are almost 
never transported by rail. According Eurostat, railway freight between Armenia and the European 
Union does not exceed 1,000 tons annually. 
General cargo volume development trends in road transport between the EAEU and the EU  
The physical volume of road-based trade turnover between the EAEU and the EU has been stable over 
the past decade and amounts to 25–30 million tons (about 25% less than the volume of railway trade 
turnover). Export and import volumes are almost equal, although in 2016, automobile exports from 
the EAEU to the EU exceeded imports.  
According to Eurostat, road-based exports from the EAEU to the European Union increased by 17% 
and reached 13.3 million tons annually. Up to 40–50% of export is timber, the shipment volume of 
which reached 6.4 million tons in 2016 (this mainly included roundwood and fuel timber from Russia 
and lumber from Belarus). The share of metal products in export volume increased from 10–12 to 15–
17% (1.8 million tons in 2016, mainly Russian steel). Another 10–15% is from fuel (1.5–2 million tons 
annually, mainly oil products from Russia). Other road export volumes are insignificant (about 300,000 
tons annually). 
The volume of road-based imports to the EAEU from the EU decreased from its 2013 maximum (20.6 
million tons) to 12.8 million tons in 2016. The imports structure is dominated by three groups of 
products, each with approximately 20–25% of total import volume: machinery and equipment; food 
and agricultural raw materials; and chemical products. Significant growth in Belarus’s imports of 
European agricultural products is due to their further re-export to Russia as a result of the 
implementation of Russian countersanctions. The shares of import flows of other commodities are 
insignificant. 
According to Eurostat, the volume of road-based exports from Russia to the EU is stable at around 7-
10 million tons annually. 40-45% of this export is timber (roundwood and fuel timber, which is mainly 
shipped to Finland), about 15% is fuel (oil products) and steel products. Volumes of other road-based 
exports are insignificant. Only 1% of automobile exports are shipped in containers. 
The volume of imports by road to Russia from the EU increased to 17.5 million tons in 2013, and then 
decreased significantly to 9.3 million tons in 2016. About 45–50% of automobile imports are 
represented by two commodity groups (about 20–25% each): machinery and equipment, and 
chemical products. The share of agricultural raw materials decreased from 25% to less than 10% (due 
to Russian countersanctions); another 10% was cellulose, 10% was paper products, and 10% was food. 
The share of container cargo in automobile imports has decreased from 10% to less than 5% over the 
past decade due to reduction in container shipments of machinery, equipment, and chemical products. 
According to Eurostat, Kazakhstan exports by road to the EU are very small (120,000–140,000 tons 
annually): long distances make road exports inefficient. Half of this volume is from agricultural raw 
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products (flax seeds), 10–15% from mineral and chemical raw materials (chromium oxides), textiles 
(cotton fibers) and metals. The volumes of automobile exports in other commodity export groups and 
the share of container cargo are insignificant. 
The volume of Kazakhstan's automobile imports from the EU doubled over the past decade and 
reached almost 0.8 million tons in 2016. About 30–50% are machinery and equipment, 20-30% are 
agricultural products (fruit), and about 20% are chemical products (mainly plastic). Containerized 
automobile import inflow to Kazakhstan is relatively small; its share does not exceed 5–10%. 
Belarus’s exports by road to the EU are rapidly increasing. According to Eurostat they grew 2.5-fold 
cover the past decade, reaching 3.3 million tons in 2016. About half of this volume is from timber, 20% 
from metal products (steel construction, pipes), and about 10% from fuel (oil products). The share of 
containerized cargo is insignificant. 
According to Eurostat, the volume of automobile imports from the EU to Belarus significantly 
increased during the past decade and reached 2.5–3 million tons annually. This growth was achieved 
by a six-fold increase in import by road of agricultural products (mainly apples, re-exported to Russia), 
the share of which reached 60% of total import volume; the imports of other commodity groups 
remained stable in physical volume but their share decreased. The share of container cargo was stable 
at around 5–10%. 
Exports from Armenia by road to the EU are insignificant at around 10,000 tons annually. They mainly 
include metal products: aluminum foil and ferro-composites. 
The volume of Armenia's imports by road from the EU is about 50,000 tons annually (according to 
Eurostat). These are mainly machinery, chemical products, and agricultural raw materials: each 
commodity volume is about 10,000 tons annually. The share of container cargo is stable at the level 
of 5–10%. 
Kyrgyzstan’s exports by road to the EU are —around 10-15 thousand tons annually. They include 
agricultural raw materials (dried vegetables) and metal products (non-ferrous scrap metal). 
Kyrgyzstan’s imports by road from the EU are relatively small according to Eurostat at the around 
30,000–60,000 tons annually. They mainly comprise mechanical engineering products (50–70%) and 
chemical products (15–20%). The share of container cargo is stable at around 5–10%. 
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Analysis of existing barriers to the development of 
international freight transport and transit along the China-
EAEU-EU axis 
General overview of logistics-related barriers in the EAEU, EU, and PRC 
To assess the international cargo transport on the PRC–EAEU–EU route several factors need to be 
taken into account in terms of their volume, structure, and potential. The main factors are economic 
(which affect freight pricing and thus the competitiveness of inland transport compared to maritime), 
technical (including the technical possibility of transporting original cargo along the route, which also 
affects its final competitiveness) and legal or institutional (including both physical and non-physical 
barriers). Although economic factors are one of the most important affecting Eurasian international 
projects, it would be a systemic mistake to exclude political factors from discussions of such issues.  
This part of the research includes both analysis and assessment of existing barriers in EU–PRC inland 
transport projects. 
Overview of railway related barriers in the EAEU, the EU and the PRC 
“The speed of the squadron depends on  
the speed of the slowest ship” 
English proverb 
Train length  
A successful approach toward the sustainable development of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative can 
be more or less described by the above-mentioned English proverb, which illustrates the main tasks, 
i.e., to increase both speed and volume of the transported cargo along the Asia–Europe–Asia (PRC–
EAEU–EU) route. Thus, the main goal here is to assess bottlenecks on the proposed routes and to 
develop an understanding of investment perspectives, transport planning, and new route 
development. 
One of the key parameters affecting freight economy is train length. Maintenance services consider a 
number of technical factors when estimating the length of cargo trains. As railway maintenance 
services in China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Germany are fully aware of the technical 
state and limitations of national railway infrastructure, they perform their activities based on technical 
and technological parameters rather than economic or political ones. Hence, before making a decision 
on increasing cargo trains along the EU–China route, the technical limitations of national railways need 
to be assessed. We would stress that the length of trains is regulated by each national rail authority 
(DB, PKP, BCh, RZD, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, Chinese Railways3) and is limited by a number of factors, 
including the length of station tracks, train weight, possibility of traction, route profile, technical 
capabilities of the route (stations, crossing points, overpasses, and road points, on-route posts, 
automatic blocking, and traffic lights), plan and profile of station tracks, conditions of shunting work 
at stations, technical and technological conditions of operation of intermediate and precinct stations, 
sorting, etc.  
                                                          
3It is worth mentioning that from Urumchi to Alashankoy and Khorgos, Chinese Railways are not developing and 
hence not planning high-speed cargo transport. 
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The loading of fitting platforms with containers is influenced by the length of trains. In EU–EAEU–PRC 
transport, 40-foot platforms are most popular length, as they can fit two 20-feet or one 40-feet 
container.4 Longer 60- and 80-foot platforms are used at the Brest/Malaszwicze) border crossing.  
Container trains from China reach the Kazakhstan border with 54 conditional carriages (1 equiv.= 
13.92 m (14m) long carriages). A 54-carriage train would therefore be 756 m long; with locomotive 
and train setting we arrive at a total length of 801 meters. For Kazakhstan this length is acceptable, as 
Dostyk station rails allows trains of this length to operate.  
In Russia, the average train contains 71 conditional carriages (994 meters), so the full train is 1040 
meters long. The train length can be smaller (about 800 m) subject to certain factors.  
Reference. The length of the train depends on the maximum length of tracks at transit stations along 
the cargo train route. Thus, some trains consist of only 40 carriages, while others (ones that bypass 
these stations) could consist of 60 or more; the train length is thus limited by of the locomotive belt 
power and rail profile. For instance, on a single-track section common in Europe), the length of the 
train has to correlate to the distance between the exit traffic lights or the side-by-side border gaps. 
Thus, train length can range from 300 to 1200 meters  
If there are empty carriages the train can be even up to 100 carriages. On the other hand, if the 
carriages in the train are heavy, it would be shorter than a usual one; this is not a violation, but 
everyday practice. Normative length of the train (number of conditional carriages in the train) is a 
technological parameter that significantly defines rail maintenance management.  
In case of BCh (The Belarusian Railway) the length of trains ranges from 57 to 65 conditional carriages, 
depending on the train route. The maximum train length in Belarus is up to 955 meters.5  
The length of trains in Poland (on PKP) is much smaller. According to the national legal regulation of 
railway transport limits, train length is a maximum of 600 meters, but development of infrastructure 
to handle 750-meter long, and even longer, trains (up to 108 conditional carriages) is planned.6  
Thus the train leaving Malaszewicze currently has a maximum of 43 conditional carriages long, and 
carries at most 86 TEU (86 x 20-feet or 43 x 40-feet containers). Hence if the train arrives at the Belarus 
border with 65 loaded conditional carriages, some of these containers will have to be reloaded to 
another train, meaning that another train will need to be created and maintained. The train can 
proceed if loaded with no more than 86 TEU, in accordance with PKP limitations on maximum weight 
of container trains. At the moment, the Brest–Malaszewicze train station is able to reload 9–10 trains 
per day so that they can proceed to Poland,7 which means that the station has approximately 860 TEU 
capacity per day, or 314,000 TEU annually. According to existing agreements, container reloading 
on/to fitting platform from/to gauge 1435/1520 mm is the responsibility of the Polish side. Belarus’s 
                                                          
4For instance, during Chinese visit to Poland in 2016 one of the events was arrival of the first container train 
from PRC – this one included 22 80-feet Sggrs platforms (driven by EU07). Each platform was loaded with 2 40-
feet containers, thus making a “showroom train”  
5 Norms of weight and length of freight trains on the sections of the Belarusian Railway for 2014/15 
/http://pandia.ru/text/80/230/80478.php 
6Krzysztof Lewandowski. Long freight trains in Poland, what is the problem of its usage? The manuscript 
delivered: April 2016. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309486866 
7«Гудок», 30 августа 2017 г., среда, N 150 (26289). 
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cross-border reloading capacity is 6 container trains per day, so from West to East, this will place a 
limitation on further transit. 
JSC “Transcontainer” estimates the potential Brest-Malaszewicze cross-border reloading capacity to 
be 200,000 TEU annually.8 The share of containers, shipped via this route to European ports is about 
0.2%. This volume would probably not affect the final container shipment volume. But this is not the 
only transport barrier: a few other factors need to be taken into account.  
Furthermore, even within the EU countries, heterogeneous standards are being applied in terms of 
the maximum allowed length of cargo trains. The maximum allowed cargo train length e.g., in Belgium, 
France, Slovakia, Czech Republic is 750 m, including locomotive (for some routes like Paris–Marseilles 
it is 850 m), in Poland it is 800 m, in Germany, 835 m and e.g., in Spain it is only 450 m. However, in 
the framework of the European Agreement on Main International Rail Lines (AGC), all countries in 
Europe that sign this agreement are expected to provide the possibility of transporting cargo trains 
up to 750m in length.  
Gauges, railways electricity infrastructure, axle load 
In the former USSR, Finland, and Mongolia, the gauge standard is 1520 mm (in Finland, it is 1524 mm), 
which allows transit via these countries without limitations. The characteristics of carriages, brakes, 
coupling devices, etc. are also compatible. 
In Western Europe, railways run on three different gauges. The most common is 1435 mm; in Spain 
and Portugal the gauge is 1668 mm; in Ireland it is 1600 mm. 
The difference in gauges between the former USSR countries (1,520 mm), China (1,435 mm), and 
Western Europe (1,435 mm) requires trains to be reloaded when carriage change occurs at border 
stations. This increases the freight costs of cargo owners and slows down the delivery.  
There are four main technologies for increasing the level of interoperability: i) transport in a container 
train with trans-loading of goods from rolling stock with a 1435/1520 mm track gauge to rolling stock 
with a 1520/1435 mm gauge; ii) use of a train with sliding wheel pairs for unobstructed transport; iii) 
extension of the 1435 mm gauge to the east (Belarus, Russia) and to the west (China, Kazakhstan) or, 
conversely, the construction of a wide gauge in central Europe and the PRC, and iv) bogie exchange at 
an interchange station. 
A Ukrainian research paper regarding this challenge found as follows.9  Net present value (NPV) 
calculations of the four opportunities indicate that the first solution leads to a traffic volume of 20-30 
million tons annually, and hence to the highest NPV (+25–30%). 
There are no technical limitations for carriages being reloaded to fit the European gauge, but, in that 
case, European carriages have to be placed on the forward and rear end of the train because in 
Western Europe a screw screed—a very old-fashioned type of engineering device) is used, while Russia 
                                                          
8Materials of the Round Table Discussion: "Problems and Prospects of Integration of Transport Systems of the 
EEMP Countries, Russia's Interests". September 14, 2017, Moscow, RISI. 
9Курган Н. Б., Гусак М.А. Повышение уровня интероперабельности в международном железнодорожном 
сообщении Россия-Украина-Словакия-Австрия. Днепропетровский национальный университет 
железнодорожного транспорта имени акад. В. Лазаряна, Днепропетровск, Украина. УДК 
339.9:625.1:656.213.073.23. 
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uses the automatic coupler CA-3 for the same purposes. Thus, a carriage has to have a screwed screed 
on one side, and an automatic coupler on the other. Covered carriages and tanks cannot be moved 
over the border to Europe due to size limitations. Furthermore, China uses Janey, an American type 
of automatic coupler, which is installed lower down than the Russian one, thus making hitching 
impossible. The height of the Chinese carriage is also lower than the Russian one. 
When transloading containers from platforms of gauge 1435/1520 mm on the track, a number of 
procedures need to be carried out for the preparation of various documents. 
The other factor limiting high speed railway transport are the differences in electrification—different 
countries use either direct or alternating current (AC) and, correspondingly, different voltage in 
electric networks. Currently, in Poland, which accepts trains from China, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Belarus, the voltage on the network is 3 kW, and is Direct Current (3 kV/DC). The same is true for 
neighboring countries: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Germany and Sweden, which are end points 
for maritime transport, use 3 kV/DC and 15 kV/AC. Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine use 3 kV/DC and 
25 kV/AC. Russia is aiming to develop only the 25 kV/AC segment, as this voltage allows train loading 
capacity to be used and lower unit costs as a result of increased locomotive power. Interchange from 
DC to AC requires locomotive replacement and thus extra time, which automatically increases the 
costs of transit.  
Russia has had significant experience in operating 23.5 and 25 ton axle load carriages. Currently 
Russian Railways are experimenting with 27 ton axle load carriages, as this type of loading minimizes 
costs per 1 ton of cargo. In the future, axle load will be able to be increased up to 30 tons if the railway 
is modernized which will not require significant costs. 
Transport companies indicate that this type of carriages is preferable, as Russian Railways is looking 
for the quickest way of increasing both cargo volume and speed, and technology-oriented ports are 
implementing equipment to serve this type of carriage.  
In China, the USA, and Australia, the axle load ranges from 30 to 40 tons (25–30, 35, 40 respectively), 
significantly decreasing infrastructure maintenance costs. According to the Association of American 
Railways (AAR) data, when the axle load increases from 27 to 32 tons, the unit costs per 1 ton of cargo 
transport decreased by more than half. 
However, each country is unique, and any transplant of international practices onto EAEU soil must 
be selective. In this case, everything hinges on infrastructure. One should remember that in all 
countries listed above rail tracks are normally laid on half-rock – this is true even for Canada, where 
most of the railway network is laid in the south, near the border with the USA. The situation in Russia 
is dissimilar – infrastructure which is built, for example, on marshy soil behaves under stress in a 
completely different manner.10 
The following are among the types of weight and structural limitations applied to trains:  
• universal: transit is allowed along the route with weight and length changes:  
• parallel (elevated or lowered): transit is allowed along the route with weight and length changes 
for refrigerator-trains and trains used for certain purposes;  
                                                          
10«Гудок», 6 сентября 2017 года, среда, N 155 (26294), p.4 
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• partial: set according to locomotive capacity and rail length at a certain station. 
Besides that, operations are implemented with differentiated weight norms, i.e., the maximum 
possible weight of the train, which is set for each rail section in accordance to main rail profile, the 
presence of construction, etc. 
The weight and length the train along the route are defined by:  
• for subnational railways: the chief of the section;  
• for national railway routes: the state railway administration of the states (for instance, head of 
JSC RZD in Russia);  
• for international railway routes: the CIS Railway Transport Council based on consultation with the 
national railways administration. 
In exceptional cases, it is possible to deviate from the set normative length of the train, but by no 
more than one conventional wagon. This is a requirement which allows better transit, but does not 
imply length or weight interchange along the route. 
Railway container transport has to switch to 80-foot fitting platforms in order to become competitive 
with maritime cargo transport which, in turn, requires development and technical implementation of 
this equipment on railways. Moreover, if the infrastructure allows (i.e., both the rails and the 
electricity infrastructure, or the diesel locomotive if there is no electricity infrastructure), it would be 
more efficient to load four 40-feet containers on the platform on top of one another, but this solution 
will significantly increase axle load. Nevertheless, the corresponding decrease in transport cost will be 
very significant. 
According to the primary data collected, in this context two factors appear to be significant, i.e., gauge 
differences in both the PRC and the EU seem to affect experts’ assessment of the perspectives for 
transport corridors. The difference in gauges in the EAEU seems to be insignificant, possibly due to 
the fact that if gauges become a problem for transit countries, exporters can simply choose a different 
route. 
 
Table 1: Linear regression between assessment of inland transport corridors between EU and PRC to 
the difference in gauges11 
Model 
Standardized 
Beta t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)  2.573 .062   
Difference in gauges 
(PRC) 
1.259 2.607 .060 .338 2.957 
Difference in gauges (EU) -1.205 -2.753 .051 .411 2.431 
Difference in gauges 
(EAEU) 
-.468 -1.432 .225 .739 1.354 
a. Dependent Variable: Rate_Silk_Road, variance explained: 68.4% 
                                                          
11based on own empirical data, collected in the period September 2017 to January 2018. 
25 
Speed of cargo trains 
From our evaluation of discussions on the various types of Europe-Asia inland cargo transport, it would 
appear that the transport speed is viewed as the most important positive feature. The challenges 
related to the routes, operation time, operation time-related delays and changes in schedule are also 
of importance, as is unfair competition on which very limited information is available.  
More than 80% of railway freight turnover in Russia today is concentrated in 20% of the railway 
network,12 i.e., the north-western and southern directions connected to maritime ports (multimodal 
routes). This route is characterized by different average speeds on different parts of the route. For the 
most part, the average cargo train speed is 80 km/hour. Of the whole route, 90 km/hour can be 
achieved only on 6% of the average length, while the average speed of 70 and 60 km/hour is 
experienced on 4,000 and 5,700 km respectively. An important of the route has limitation on the 
speed of empty carriages. 
The average speed on these main routes was more than 70 km/hour in the first half of the year 2017, 
the average section speed for cargo trains was 41.8 km/hour, while the average technical speed of 
cargo trains was 47.7 km/hour, so the route average speed is 692.2 km/day13. 
Analyzing the reasoning behind the speed changes has allowed us to identify more than 3,200 barrier 
sections of the main railway route with a total length of 22,800 km. These sections lead to decreased 
train speed.  
In 2016 Russia launched a program targeting a reduction in the length of sections with an established 
speed of less than 80 km/h over 1,100 km of track. If the program reaches target indicators, the length 
of the route with an average speed of 90 km/h will double. 
The average speed of freight trains in China is 35.6 km/h, but when trains approach Alashankou (at 
the border with Kazakhstan) the speed reduces to 28–30 km/h (due to single-track traffic: the second 
rail has not yet been opened). 
The average speed of cargo trains in the EU countries is also low. On international sections, the 
average speed of cargo trains is about 18.2 km/h. According to a European Chamber of Auditors 
analysis, many EU countries have not paid enough attention to increasing the speed of cargo trains: 
lack of investment, not modernizing, etc. 
It is worth mentioning that container train transport times in the EAEU countries are faster than in the 
EU (where there is a drastic decrease in train speed) while the cost of transport in Europe (in terms of 
tariffs) is much higher than in the EAEU. However, this might not really be important, as the distance 
from final the destination in the EU to the Belarus border is much shorter than the distance to the 
border of China/Kazakhstan, Russia/China, or Russia/Mongolia. 
International cross-border points (Brest-Malaszewicze border point) 
In the 1995–2015 period, the length of the main railway in Poland decreased by almost a quarter (23%) 
from 23,986 km to 18,510 km. At the same time, the length of the "two-way" is now 8,606 km (46.5%), 
and the electrified railway totals 11,777 km (63.6%). 
                                                          
12“Гудок”, 06.09.2017, N 155 (26294), p.5 
13http://www.rzd.ru/static/public/ru?STRUCTURE_ID=5232&layer_id=3290&refererLayerId=162&id=4083 
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According to A. Evsyuk, the first deputy head of the freight service and foreign economic activity of 
the Belarusian Railway, in the next few years it will be difficult to increase transit through Poland: the 
infrastructure, locomotive, and carload parks all require updating, and the average speed of Polish 
freight car is the lowest in the EU. Currently, instead of transferring 14 agreed schedule "threads" per 
day, Poland takes only 9–10 trains. 
At the beginning of 2017 Poland received 17 billion euros EU funding for the period to 2020 to carry 
out technical modernization of sections of the railway to further the development of freight transport 
and transit.  
One of the goals of the Polish railway company RRC is to return to freight traffic. In the last 20 years 
priority had been given to the passenger sector, and infrastructure investments were mainly directed 
to that sector. By 2014 only 15% of the network was modernized. The average speed of freight trains 
on the RRC network was 27 km/h; freight operators’ access to roads was fraught with complexity.  
Of the funds allocated by the EU, the first tender was carried out to modernize the sections of the 
route from Třebinia to Zebrzydovice (76 km, west of Kraków toward Czech Bohumin) in order to 
develop transit traffic from the Polish ports in the Baltic to the south of Europe, mainly to the Czech 
Republic.  
However, there is a sense that up to 2020 (the timeframe for the implementation of investment plans) 
transit traffic of trains through Poland will remain at today's level. The capacity at the shoulder of 
Brest (Belarus)–Terespol (Poland) remains the same.  
According to the rules of the Agreement on the international rail freight communication (SMGS), the 
side receiving the shipment transports the containers. When the cargo is transferred to Europe, the 
Polish side transports within Europe; Belarus transfers to Belarus. However, in the agreement, it is 
possible, by agreement, to delegate such powers to the party transmitting the cargo. In 2016, the 
Belarusian Railway invested heavily in the Brest transport hub and reduced the processing time of 
transit compounds from 36 to 10 hours with an overload and up to 6 hours without an overload. 
Nevertheless, there are still no prerequisites for a radical increase in traffic volumes. Based on the 
existing conditions, with the reception on the Polish side of only 10 trains per day and the reloading 
of the containers on to the Polish platform, it is possible to take up to 300 trains a month, and 
approximately 3,600 in a year. 
At the end of October 2017, a pilot container train service was launched from Poland to China with 
cargoes transhipped at Chernyakhovsk Station and then carried to the Chernyshevskoe–Kybartai 
(Lithuania) crossing point.  
International agreements 
SMGS - Agreement on International Railway Freight. 
COTIF - Convention on International Carriage by Rail (Western Europe). 
CIM – Universal legal prescriptions to the treaty on international rail freight transport (Annex B to 
COTIF). 
The main commercial challenge to increasing cargo turnover between the countries of Europe and the 
CIS is the regulatory differences between them. In European countries railway transport is regulated 
by the provisions to the "Treaty on International Railway Transport" (COTIF / COTIF). The Ministries of 
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Transport and railway administrations of the CIS countries, Baltic States, Albania, Iran, China, the DPRK, 
Vietnam, Mongolia, Hungary, and Slovakia are regulated under the "Agreement on International 
Railway Freight" (SMGS). 
SMGS and COTIF (subject to CIM14) govern the same issues, but resolve them in a completely different 
manner. This is true primarily for liability and compensation for partial loss of cargo and failure to 
meet delivery deadlines. The differences became more pronounced following the adoption of a new 
version of COTIF in 1999 (the so-called Vilnius Protocol of July 3, 1999). By way of an example, SMGS 
envisages the duty to transport the cargo, and the duty to set the freight rate. The new version of 
COTIF does not permit different contract models. 
Therefore, acceptance and dispatch of cargoes throughout the entire route between COTIF and SMGS 
are impossible in terms of both transport law and compliance with customs requirements. Inasmuch 
as it appears impossible to unify legal norms at this stage, it was resolved, at a series of joint meetings 
of representatives of CIT/OSJD (Central [European] Institute of Transport/Organisation for 
Cooperation of Railways), to create a shipping document that would be recognized by all stakeholders, 
and contain all data required by both COTIF and SMGS. 
To do this, the SMGS was modified, but this modification did not fit in with Soviet and the Russian 
railway legal regulations, which form the basis of the SMGS. 
These amendments included a few positions that influence container shipments along the PRC–EEA–
EU axis. Two new annexes appeared in the Agreement: Rules for cargo transport (an annex 1 to SMGS) 
and Rules for the transport of the carriage that does not belong to the transport company (Annex 4 
to SMGS). 
International transport planning and the reloading of goods from one national railway to another has 
fundamentally changed. Previously, the receiving railway body was obliged to transport all the cargo 
from the sending organization in the country of departure. However, under the new regulations and 
before concluding a contract for the carriage of goods, there has to be preliminary coordination by 
direct international communication between the sender and carrier.  
The fact that planning and actual transportation of foreign trade shipments are subject to approval 
prevents the exporters from being sure that their applications for shipments will get a positive 
response. The supplier has to coordinate the transport infrastructure application with transport 
organizations, administrations of other national railways. The transport company can also run into 
restrictions on the route for the foreign trade cargo delivery, or lack of technical and technological 
capabilities for the delivery of goods in direct international traffic, etc. All this forces the exporter to 
seek ways of influencing certain structures that will provide him/her with an uninterrupted procedure 
for coordinating the international carriage of goods. The SMGS article referring to the Rules for the 
Goods Transport contains a new legal regulation for the SMGS:  
The contract between the consignor, the consignee and the transport company participating 
in the transport may establish special conditions for the carriage of goods, these conditions 
have priority over the conditions that are not set by the Agreement – and there is no way to 
evaluate what risks are involved which are defined by the treaties and not assessed by the 
                                                          
14CIM – Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Rail (Annex B to COTIF). 
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agreement. Such fears are reflected by Article 39 § 3 of the SMGS, which deals with of the 
responsibility of the transport company. The carrier is not responsible for the loss, shortage, 
damage of cargo accepted for transport, if they occurred during transport of cargo on special 
contractual terms, and exemption from liability is provided for by these special contractual 
conditions.  
To reduce these risks, it is very important to explain details of these new Articles of SMGS from 
national railway company. 
The normative time of goods delivery has increased. Now the delivery time for large-capacity 
containers is calculated based on the norm of 150 km per day, and for the remaining shipments of 
cargos, 200 km per day. A significant improvement in delivery time is unlikely to satisfy the sender. 
For this SMGS provides a contractual opportunity to increase the speed of delivery and thus shorten 
the delivery period. It should also be noted that the regulatory speeds for the delivery of goods (small, 
large, with passenger-trains) in the previous versions of the SMGS are not available in the latest 
version of the Agreement. 
Basic changes involve the responsibility of the railways. First of all, there are procedural changes for 
calculating damages, including partial loss of cargo caused by the fault of the rail transport company. 
If the carrier has to reimburse the damage caused by the loss of the cargo proved by the consignor or 
consignee, the amount of the damage to be paid must correspond to the value of the goods. In the 
legislation of different countries, the value of cargo is treated differently (market value, cost on the 
waybill, etc.), which introduces its own serious ramifications. 
Documentation requirements  
The set of documents for a container train on the Belarusian Railway/ Polish railways consists of the 
following: 
1. Notification of the OKP and customs office on the time and the way of arrival of the train and 
the way out to the train: internal station documentation  
2. Border–customs control: 25 min. 
3. Delivery of carriage documentation to the wagon transfer point: 15 min. 
4. Registration of carriages documentation: 2 min. 
5. Delivery of carriage documentation to the agent of the corresponding road (CU/ RCP): 1 min. 
6. Reception, maintenance, and commercial inspection of the train: 65 min. 
TOTAL - 97 minutes. Estimated time is given only for registration of documents. 
These operations are designed for a container train carrying up to 60 containers. The composition 
includes either 20 specialized platforms (three 20-foot containers or one 40-and one 20-foot 
container) or 30 specialized platforms with two 20-foot or one 40-foot containers. 
If more platforms are accepted, the times increase. 
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Tariffs 
It is reported that Chinese transport tariffs are being subsidized from the state budget. According to 
analysts from Moscow Carnegie Center, linking a project to a large concept like the Silk Road makes it 
easier to obtain budget funding. The main reason for the whole concept was the development of a 
transcontinental logistics infrastructure. This makes almost every Chinese region regularly report on 
successes in the opening or modernization of the East-West transport routes. However, in practice, 
all these routes are unprofitable, and for the sake of maintaining their existence, local administrations 
interested in preserving the showcase of their "successes" are forced to subsidize them. 
As for Russia, the main volumes of containers are carried out by OTLK Corporation, which includes 
legal entities from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. 
In accordance with the Annex to the Protocol on the coordinated transport policy (Appendix No. 24 
to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty)), the 
Organization of Rail Transport, irrespective of the consumer's belonging to a particular Member State 
(or legal form) provide him with access to rail transport services taking into account this Procedure 
and the laws of the Member States. According to paragraph 4. Member States shall ensure that 
carriers of Member States have access to infrastructure services in accordance with the principles and 
requirements specified in Annexes 1 and 2 .... A.6. Tariffs for railway transport services and (or) their 
maximum level (new limits) are established (modified) in accordance with the legislation of the 
Member States and international treaties, with the possibility of differentiating tariffs in accordance 
with the legislation of their Member State with observance of the following principles: ... 3) ensuring 
the transparency of tariffs for railway transport services, 4) ensuring publicity of making decisions on 
setting tariffs for railway services. 
When cargo is transported by rail, the unified tariffs for the types of operations (export, import, and 
domestic tariffs) apply to the territories of the CIS. 
When transporting goods from the territory of one CIS state in transit through the territory of another 
Member State to third countries and in the opposite direction (except for the carriage of goods 
through seaports of Member States), as well as for the carriage of goods from third countries to third 
countries through transit through territories (coordinated) tariff policy in accordance with the Concept 
for the Establishment of an Harmonized Tariff Policy for Rail Transport of the Member States of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States of 18 October 1996. 
Policy recommendations and measures for removing barriers in international 
freight transport 
The infrastructural initiative “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) is positioned by the Chinese government 
as a mega-project, which is planned to be developed and implemented in a number of countries, using 
own investment resources and those of the partner countries involved. Any international initiative of 
such a scale requires the participation of the state and its governmental institutions to provide political 
status (for instance, as a financial guarantor and to be responsible for infrastructural land allocation, 
spatial planning authority, environmental conclusions, and other feasibility studies, etc.). Of 16 
megaprojects being implemented today worldwide, with an approximate investment volume of 
USD0.5 to 31 billion focusing on transport and infrastructure development, four projects are initiatives 
of China and four of the USA, and all of them are being carried out in OBOR countries, mainly using 
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their own resources. There is no confirmed information from available or public sources on the actual 
OBOR infrastructural investments that China has made as at the end of 2017. However, plenty of 
information, sometimes very controversial, is being published that describes, for example, the 
creation of an investment fund varying in size from USD700 to 900 billion; “concrete” implementation 
plans of the OBOR initiative; creation of several intergovernmental and other commissions aiming to 
promote the OBOR initiative, etc. At the same time, of the intensity of the Chinese capital activity is 
noted in the south and southwest direction, e.g., toward the Indian Ocean, where its goal is to create 
a sustainable railway–port infrastructure so that some of the cargo flow from overloaded Chinese 
ports on the eastern coast of the country can be diverted. 
The business community of the EU countries understands that attracting significant capital from the 
PRC to the transport infrastructure of Europe is not possible for several reasons:  
(1) The White Paper on Transport-2050 clearly articulates the main development priorities that 
do not assume a significant increase in land transport (cf. environmental policy); 
(2) Europe is very careful about the Chinese capital or investment flows into European transport 
infrastructural projects and their possible risks; 
(3) In 2013 the European Union refused the proposal of the former President of the Republic of 
Korea for creating a Eurasian transport corridor from Seoul–London, pointing out the 
necessity to focus rather on domestic issues and saying that there was "already a high level 
of maritime transport development independent of the transit policies of third countries"; 
(4) The EU has consistently distanced itself from investing in Russia’s transport infrastructure 
projects in general and transit in particular. The EU refused Russia's proposals for joint 
investment projects that might have significantly increased cooperation in the field of 
transport (for example, in the 1990s, the construction of seaports in the Baltic Sea region, 
such as Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Batareinaya, in order to create a so-called “European Deepwater 
Ring” through the reconstruction of the Volga-Don and Volga-Baltic canals and other related 
projects. The refusal was mainly motivated by lack of interest and the need to focus on 
internal projects. 
In the medium-term perspective, the development of Eurasian cargo transport will focus on the 
maritime segment. This is mainly due to increased cargo capacity of ships, the deployment of high-
speed reloading/handling machines and mechanisms, the development of new warehouse 
technologies and innovations, etc. In 2016, approximately 59.8 million tons of cargo were delivered 
from China to the EU countries, of which 58.1 million tons were seaborne trade. At the same time, 
shipments from the EU countries to China amounted to approximately 49.1 million tons, of which 48 
million tons were transported by sea. 
In the framework of the Eurasian overland freight traffic, the main cargo volumes are being 
transported by rail. However, even with a possible increase in absolute figures (e.g., up to 310,000–
350000 TEU per year), railway transport will lag significantly behind sea shipping. In 2016, 
approximately 0.6 million tons were delivered from China to the EU countries, and 0.4 million tons in 
the opposite direction. 
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In 2016 the cargo flow from the EAEU countries to the EU countries amounted to approximately 36.6 
million tons, whereas 23 million tons (fuel and minerals) were delivered to the Baltic ports and over 8 
million tons of timber to Finland. "Pure” or “dedicated cargo to "distant" EU countries accounted for 
about 1.5 million tons; the same amount was imported by rail to the countries of the EAEU. 
In 2013 in the export-import the "peak years,” around 30 million tons of goods from various countries 
were transported by road through border crossings points Belarus/Russian Federation to the EU. In 
2015, 26.1 million tons were transported. According to experts, an increase of up to 35–40 million 
tons per year in cargo transport is possible, but in practice these volumes have never been achieved; 
moreover, the possibilities of border crossings at these loading levels have not yet been properly 
studied. 
Compared to the maritime mode, rather less attention is paid to the development of railway transport 
in Europe. In the last 7–8 years, the share of railway in the total volume of domestic transport has not 
exceeded 18.3%, while the share of road-based transport accounts for up to 75–75.2% (in terms of 
freight turnover). 
This study, inter alia, indicates that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia are consistently increasing the 
capacities of their railways in various parameters, taking into account not only traditional transport of 
goods by this mode, but also respecting the current requirements of environmental policy regulations. 
The growth of transit cargo transport in the framework of the Eurasian transport corridor will depend 
heavily on the technical conditions of the Polish railways (PKP S.A.) and also of the German Railways 
(Deutsche Bahn [DB]). At the moment, the input parameters of the Polish railways do not allow 
railway-traffic trains formed by RZD and BCh to fully enter the PKP S.A. railway infrastructure for a 
number of technical reasons. In particular, these technical constraints are: the length of freight trains 
(maximum allowed number of wagons in a freight train), types of fitting platforms for the transport of 
containers, maximum allowed load on axle, maximum allowed speed of freight trains (commercial, 
sector speeds, etc.). Thus, the length of the train by RZD averages 1040 m (cf. in Poland it is 600 m), 
the load on the axis may be 23.5 and even 25 tons (cf. in Europe, 22.5 tons). Furthermore, train speed 
parameters vary significantly (for example, the routing speed of freight trains in the Russian 
Federation is 692.2 km/day). The electrification of railway networks in Europe is not uniform in terms 
of voltage and electric current. 
Such factors as the reloading of containers from platforms of gauge 1520 mm on to platforms of gauge 
1435 mm and other way round, which also applies to the Kazakh-Chinese border crossings points, is 
also contributing to a reduction of the overall speed of the freight trains. 
In terms of other barriers, it can be noted that customs procedures at the border-crossing points of 
the EAEU/EU normally take time, in accordance with the regulations of the respective countries/roads; 
and how long clearance takes on one side or the other is approximately the same, especially during 
the period of mutual sanctions. Another important factor, which, in our opinion, is practically 
neglected in publications and at relevant conferences, is the different regulatory and legal framework, 
i.e., the SMGS and COTIF agreements. In particular, this refers to transfer on border-crossing points, 
the authority for possession of goods, risks, liability, etc. In the present research study, the criteria 
mentioned have a significant impact on the transport economy, especially in terms of increased costs. 
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With regard to the allocation of projects for the development of transport infrastructure that would 
meet the political objectives set by the government in Kazakhstan and Russia and targeting the 
national transport business, the following may be mentioned: 
In Russia, construction within the BelKomUr project, which has an estimated capacity of 30 million 
tons per year, is proceeding very slowly for number of reasons. When the project is completed and 
deployed, cargo will be partially shipped from the Baltic to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk so that the 
railway capabilities released can be efficiently utilized by EAEU partners. These considerations are 
quite viable and are being asked for on condition that the investment requirements, as well as material 
balances for cargo flows, are investigated appropriately. 
Based on this study, some suggestions concerning cross-border technologies could be also proposed.  
The international coordination of Euro-Asia container transport is under “the Umbrella” Coordinating 
Council on Trans-Siberian Transport (CCTT). Presently the CCTT has more than 100 member societies 
from 23 countries, including the railways of Europe, Asia, and the CIS states, leading shipping 
companies, operators and forwarders, ports and stevedoring companies, public organizations, 
administrations and municipalities, telecom and marketing companies, security services, and mass 
media. CCTT is in a close dialogue with OSJD, UIC, UNECE Inland Transport Committee, CIT, EAEU, 
ESCAP, OTIF, WCO and UPU. The international mechanisms have thus been created and now need to 
be used to activate cooperation in OBOR.  
Investments in infrastructure are needed. Real bottlenecks could appear along the railway routes and 
roads if traffic intensity were to rise significantly. As demonstrated above, some modernization of the 
carrying and transshipping capacities are needed in border-crossing points (like China–Russia, China–
Kazakhstan, Belarus–Poland). Enlargement of double tracks up to 100 km into the hinterland of border 
zones direction are needed to carry container trains faster away from these zones.  
Building and the effective use of new container terminals across the PRC, the EAEU, and the EU need 
to be fully defined. It is necessary to separate transit transports (without intermediary stops) and 
commercial transport with cargo addressed to domestic clients.  
The task to improve transport via Polish railway infrastructure has to be correlated with the EU’s Polish 
plans for the next 20–25 years. New research in the transport sphere shows the possible appearance 
of high modern transport technologies and large changes in rolling stock machinery.  
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Potential interest of the EU countries and China to increase 
trans-Eurasian overland transit 
During the last decade, socioeconomic cooperation and the bilateral investment climate between the 
European Union and China has intensified significantly, e.g., in the areas of environmental protection, 
research and innovation development, education, trade interaction, etc. With respect to strategic 
development papers such as the Europe 2020 strategy, the Strategic Investment Plan (also known as 
“Juncker Plan”), the PRC's 13th five-year plan, the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation,15 
the EU–PRC Investment Agreement, it can be stated that this cooperation has a sustainable character 
and its intensity will increase in the very near future. One of the practical examples of this cooperation 
is the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. 
Initiated by the Chinese government in the year 2013, OBOR (also known as “New Silk Way” or “Belt 
and Road Initiative”) cannot be called a precise or a definite development program with a clear budget, 
nor does it have definite stakeholders with defined responsibilities. The OBOR initiative can be seen 
rather as a very broad conceptual framework including future possible political, economic, and 
transport development policies that aim for economic and transport integration with a special focus 
on connectivity in the whole Eurasian space and between Europe and China in particular. In spite of 
the fact that OBOR implies a broad area of multilateral cooperation between the countries involved, 
the main focus is rather on the strategic development of the land-based transport corridor between 
China and Europe in a very wide perspective. Although according to the official document of the 
Chinese Government: “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road”, which supports an inclusion principle, i.e., it is open to any country or private 
investors interested in the development of common infrastructural projects, the OBOR is identified 
not as a strategy but as an initiative, which means the development of infrastructural projects that 
have been identified and planned in advance.16 At the same time, the Chinese government has clearly 
stated that OBOR is a non-exclusive international initiative, which implies open participation of all EU 
member states and other countries in ongoing activities and encourages them to 1propose their own. 
Moreover, it has also been declared that OBOR is fully compliant with the existing relevant national 
and European infrastructure development and connectivity plans.  
Formally, the European Union has already positively responded to the OBOR initiative, by suggesting 
a Connectivity Platform for EU–China cooperation on infrastructure and transport. Apart from political 
statements of commitment and express of interests, not a single European country, nor the EU 
Commission has formulated a clear and comprehensive action identifying concrete measures that EU 
countries might contribute to in developing the OBOR initiative. Moreover, a number of the EU 
member states see OBOR rather as a political framework that aims to advance China’s relationship 
with the transit countries and especially with the Russian Federation.17  
                                                          
15http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/20131123_agenda_2020__en.pdf 
16http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html  
17cf. Europe and China’s New Silk Roads | ETNC Report, December 2016 
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OBOR-related legal environment and investment funds  
Although the Chinese authorities claim that 65 countries have already declared their interest and 
commitment to the OBOR project, 18  no official list of the participating countries or of involved 
stakeholders has been presented. It should be added that no generally accepted definition of the 
OBOR initiative has been identified to date that describes the project’s geography, involved 
stakeholders, allocated budget, etc. The OBOR projects may therefore imply any activities of China or 
other involved stakeholder that contributes to improved connectivity across Eurasia. The declared 
financial commitment to the OBOR initiative according to different sources varies from USD 500 to 
1400 billion.19  
Although at the moment, there is no common EU-level strategy, no officially appointed fund operator, 
and no official financial instruments in terms of coordination or management of the infrastructural 
projects within OBOR. The following financial instruments that contribute to improved connectivity 
between Europe and Asia and that may be associated with OBOR are listed here: 
• Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI); 
• Partnership Instrument (PI) for cooperation with third countries; 
• European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); 
• Silk Road Fund (SRF); 
• Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); 
• 16+1 mechanism, created for multilateral cooperation between China and Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEE); 
• Affiliated financial structures within the Eurasian Economic Union, e.g., Eurasian Development 
Bank. 
DCI – aims not at infrastructural projects, but rather at inter-regional integration projects, such as 
trade facilitation, internet connectivity, research and development projects between Europe and Asia. 
PI – focuses on cooperation projects in the fields of transport, energy, digital economy, trade, and 
investment. However, it should be noted that the PI instrument is used mainly as a preparation 
framework for future direct investments, not as a fund for direct investments.  
ENI – along with the projects that aim at energy, digital connectivity, the ENI instrument also supports 
important cooperation in the field of cross-border management, including security, trade facilitation, 
harmonization of regulatory frames in transport. In this context, such programs as Horizon2020 or the 
TEN-T infrastructure development fund, which aim at cohesion, interconnection, and interoperability 
of the trans-European transport network. 
SRF - is more related to OBOR, was created in 2014 with a budget of USD 40 billion, aims to finance 
rail and port infrastructure projects in Southeast Europe; the most relevant project is the Piraeus-
Belgrade-Budapest corridor,20  which e.g., involves the construction of a new high-speed rail line 
linking the Balkans and Hungary. In terms of the financial coverage of OBOR investments, the last 
                                                          
18https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/china-new-silk-road-explainer/  
19a) EURASIAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, December 2015, The New Silk Road: A Path to Regional Security?; 
b) https://www.weforum.org/  
20Balkan rail part of Chinese "express lane" to Europe – Euractiv, 18 December 2014. 
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investment in SRF took place in November 2017, and deals with energy infrastructure collaborative 
development.  
AIIB – was created on the initiative of China in December 2015 as an intergovernmental regional bank 
and started functioning in January 2016 with the endowment of ca. 100 billion USD21. AIIB's capital is 
shared by 57 countries, including 14 EU member states which represent 19.43% of its share and China 
which has 25.6%. Compared to the Silk Road Fund (SRF), which mostly focuses on the investments of 
land and maritime infrastructure development projects, the AIIB has a bigger coverage and is seen as 
a financial instrument that supports OBOR-related investments in the whole Asia. At the moment, 
there are a number of ongoing OBOR-related projects that, although implemented outside the 
European Union, involve European stakeholders, applying e.g., to infrastructure development projects 
in Africa or in Asia. In this context, AIIB, which comprises 14 EU member states as founding members 
with a strong focus on Asia, acts totally independently and may not formally be following the OBOR 
policy or Chinese guidance; on the other hand, the current AIIB strategy is closely related and fully 
compliant with the OBOR initiative and its actions.  
CEE - in spite of the inclusive approach for the participation in the OBOR initiative declared by China, 
China is focusing on certain European regions in setting priorities for promotion of infrastructure 
investments. In this context, China identified two target regions in terms of OBOR investments’ i.e., 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Southern Europe or Mediterranean countries. To promote 
OBOR actions in CEE countries, in April 2012 a so-called “16+1” mechanism was created by 16 CEE 
countries and China. Apart from such topics as expanding the economic and trade scale, investment 
liberalization, and facilitation, this structure aims to encourage participating countries to invest into 
transport- related projects, including land, sea, air, and also Internet connectivity. Furthermore, the 
“16+1” platform currently actively involves other Eastern European countries like Belarus, Moldova, 
and Ukraine in OBOR-related actions. Although no platform similar to 16+1 has been established so 
far for the six Mediterranean countries (here: Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Italy, Spain and Portugal), China’s 
officials have clearly declared their interest in investing in transport, agricultural and maritime sector 
projects.22 In the context of current political tensions with Russian, European skepticism should be 
mentioned in connection with China’s clear statements that it will respect Russia’s perceived sphere 
of influence within OBOR initiative. For example, some EU countries believe that China did not allow 
Moldova and Ukraine to join the 16+1 mechanism due to Russian concerns.23  
The main focus of OBOR investments funds is transport or infrastructural projects, e.g. container 
terminals, rails, etc. However, the fund is also investing into such areas as energy, environment, and 
innovation.  
Not only European, but also Chinese investors are showing great interest in the infrastructure 
development projects in Europe, e.g., COSCO - China’s shipping and logistics giant has invested or has 
expressed an interest in investing in port infrastructure development projects in such countries as 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Croatia, Slovenia, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Latvia, and Lithuania.24 In terms of 
                                                          
21http://www.mid.ru/drugie-finansovye-organizacii/-/asset_publisher/km9HkaXMTium/content/id/2517438#_ftn1 
22Cf. Think-tank Network on China (2016). Europe and China’s New Silk Roads, ETNC report 2016, pp 10-15 
23Makocki, M. (2017). China’s Road: into Eastern Europe, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 
February 2017 
24cf. Christina Lin (2016), ‘China Drops Anchor in Mediterranean Ports’, MERICS Blog, 25 May 2016 
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the railways, such examples of the EU-China common projects that are relevant to trans-Eurasian 
overland transit as the planned construction of a new Belgrade–Budapest railway may be 
mentioned.25 Furthermore, a number of Chinese local authorities and Chinese companies are involved 
in the overland freight services, connecting various Chinese cities with destinations in Belgium, 
Germany, Finland, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Related to this, 
it should be mentioned that many of these EU–China port and rail infrastructure development projects 
started before the OBOR had been initiated, and at the moment all of them have been generally 
“labelled” or “upgraded” as OBOR-related projects. 
In spite of the clear interest from EU member states to the OBOR initiative, the European Commission 
has underlined the importance of monitoring the investments implemented in the framework of 
OBOR, especially the investments on EU territory, which are expected to comply with the relevant EU 
strategies.26 The rather optimistic perceptions of Chinese declarations of intent in 2012–2015 in terms 
of financing of infrastructural project in CEE, has not matched the reality of the European stakeholders. 
A number of evaluations of ongoing Chinese investments related to OBOR demonstrate that recipient 
countries can expect a number of organizational and technical problems.27 
From the European point of view, the optimistic anticipation of possible Chinese investments and 
associated economic growth within OBOR corridor cannot be treated separately from other basic 
socio-political factors or the potential entry of China into the European Fund for Strategic Investments 
(EFSI) and its role in the decision-making process of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
Furthermore, the Juncker Plan implies the deployment of a European Fund for Strategic Investments 
(EFSI), that would deliver ca. 315 billion euro (expanded to 500 billion euro) into long-term investment 
projects. 28  Chinese officials have already expressed their interest in participating in projects 
mentioned in the Investment Plan for Europe. These plans are also expected to be co-funded by the 
TEN-T and ENI funds.  
According to Europe and China’s New Silk Roads Report, the investments in OBOR are mostly limited 
to AIIB investment projects.29 While China’s OBOR approach has been mainly targeting the CEE and 
Mediterranean countries, other parts of Europe have not been entirely neglected and the list of 
countries forming part of OBOR is evolving. In accordance with existing agreements, OBOR-related 
investments are also being implemented in such countries as: Spain, Poland, Netherlands, Italy, 
Greece and Hungary, while the rest either do not fulfill European requirements, or are of no interest 
to Chinese partners.  
In terms of the transit countries, as was partly indicated earlier, although the investment character in 
the countries concerned is related rather to national infrastructure development plans than directly 
to the OBOR initiative, these countries have still clearly demonstrated their interest in participation in 
                                                          
25https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2017/11/27/chinas-bid-to-buy-eastern-europe- 
on-the-cheap-the-161-group/#773ca7943467 
26 Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, amending Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulations 
(EC) No 680/2007 and (EC) No 67/2010 
27Makocki, M. (2017). China’s Road: into Eastern Europe, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 
February 2017 
28Same. 
29Europe and China’s New Silk Roads | ETNC Report, December 2016 
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the OBOR projects and in deploying the above-mentioned European and Chinese investments 
instruments for implementing them. 
Evaluation of potential interest of the EU countries and businesses in making use 
of the trans-Eurasian land corridors 
According to the primary data gained, at the moment, the general will of the potential investors from 
the EU countries to participate in the OBOR related projects greatly depends upon the level of 
sustainability and transparency in terms of investments decision making rather than on economic 
profitability or project payback. 
To analyze the general interest of organizations involved, private companies or investors in 
infrastructural projects within OBOR, the stakeholders interviewed were asked to estimate their 
general willingness to invest in OBOR infrastructural projects with a break down into three 
geographical scope areas (here: China, EU, and transit countries like Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, etc.) 
and into two time perspectives, i.e. in the mid-term perspective (here: by 2015) and in the long-term 
perspective (here: by the year 2040). 
Figure 1. Investments considerations into OBOR related projects by 202530 
 
 
Results showed that European investors are currently ready to invest in OBOR-related infrastructural 
project in China, Europe, and transit countries such as Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc.  
As expected, the risk perception of the companies interviewed grows in the long term, along with a 
corresponding reduction in the willingness to invest in all target areas. It must be mentioned, however, 
that in China and the transit countries, negative dynamics decreased disproportionately over the long 
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term compared with EU member states. The companies interviewed explained this by the high level 
of uncertainty regarding political and economic stability in China and the transit countries. 
Figure 2. Investments considerations into OBOR related projects by 204031 
 
 
To increase the attractiveness of OBOR-related projects in the mid- or long-term perspective, the 
European stakeholders indicated that potential Chinese investors should be rather motivated to direct 
participation in infrastructure development projects instead of just lending financial resources to 
European or other involved partners. These direct investments and the commercial risk sharing could 
improve the investment attractiveness of OBOR projects in general and for European stakeholders in 
particular, and it could be viewed as the sign of favorable and sustainable investment climate. 
The following figure shows the estimated framework of the possible investments into OBOR-related 
projects broken down into three geographical scope areas (here: China, EU and transit countries like 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, etc.). Whereas the potential stakeholders contemplating investments 
into European infrastructural projects, stated their interest in form of relatively larger investments 
frames (e.g. 1-2 or 2-5 million euro), the potential investors in OBOR related initiatives in China or in 
the transit countries clearly voted for rather moderate or small investment volumes. This decision was 
again explained by the companies interviewed by the relatively high level of uncertainty in terms of 
political and economic stability in China and in the transit countries. 
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Figure 3. Estimated distribution of investments’ volumes into OBOR infrastructural projects32 
 
 
In the framework of the primary data collection, the organizations interviewed were asked to evaluate 
a number of criteria that might be relevant to the investments in logistics operations decision making 
(e.g. quality of transport and logistics infrastructure, efficiency of cross-border procedures, etc.; cf. 
Annex).  
To develop an understanding about correlation of the factors analyzed with a potential decision to 
invest (i.e., what factors might influence investor’s willingness to invest in OBOR-related 
infrastructural projects) an automated linear regression analysis was conducted. As can be seen (cf. 
figure 4), potential stakeholders’ willingness to invest depends surprisingly on quality of institutions 
(in EU and China), and such factors as customs efficiency and quality of transport infrastructure also 
play an important role. 
As seen from the figure, European investors’ willingness to invest in the EU parts of OBOR 
infrastructure depends almost solely on the quality of institutions in China (e.g., investment in Polish 
railway infrastructure might be positively considered by investors, if they are sure that Chinese 
institutions are stable). 
In the case of Chinese investments, the willingness to invest in China is related to the quality of Chinese 
infrastructure: thus, the investors are not ready to invest in Chinese infrastructure projects from 
scratch. On the other hand, where investments from Chinese side are already committed and ongoing, 
the European investors might positively consider sharing the commercial and political risks. 
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Figure 4. Correlation of investment willingness to selected criteria33 
 
 
Regarding the transit countries, the willingness to invest in OBOR-related projects has been defined 
solely by the quality of government regulations in the transit countries. Hence, investors might be 
willing to invest in transport-related infrastructure if they are certain that institutional quality in China 
will at least remain sustainable or will be improved in the future, i.e., conditioned to the potential 
investors’ confidence in the sustainability of governmental regulations, and regulation quality and 
transparency in the transit countries. 
Figure 5. Correlation of investment willingness in EU and China to selected criteria34 
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Note that both factors are so-called “soft” factors (e.g., regulation-based and not infrastructure-
based), and therefore the potential investors might tend to overestimate the risks as they are 
confident about the dynamics of institutions and future government regulations. One consequence or 
option named by companies interviewed was to postpone investments until risks are predictable and 
policymaking became more transparent or sustainable. 
To evaluate willingness to invest in the EU, PRC, and transit countries in terms of development of 
transport corridors, another automated linear regression analysis was implemented targeting 
willingness to invest in EU, PRC, transit countries. The set of independent variables included over 300 
positions (cf. Annex), and significant correlations were considered. 
The correlations analysis suggested that the willingness to invest in infrastructural projects in China, 
the EU, or transit countries as a part of transport corridors is mainly related to: 
• quality of national logistics infrastructure; 
• quality of institutions; 
• logistic-related costs. 
However, these factors have to be considered for different countries differently, e.g., it has been 
noted that national logistics infrastructure and quality of institutions are significant for China only and 
in this particular case of the quality of Chinese institutions has been evaluated as high. 
Furthermore, logistics-related costs seem to be very significant especially for the transit countries, i.e., 
the willingness to invest in infrastructure projects decreases if investors are not confident about 
logistics related costs/tariffs and their possible dynamics on a sustainable basis. 
The following figure indicates the relevance of selected challenges to investment perspectives in terms 
of overland transport. As can be seen, European investors still perceive the challenges and risks in the 
transit countries as relatively higher than in the EU or in China, for instance, such criteria as difference 
in gauges, as identified above, in transit countries or unsustainable transport tariffs. On the other hand, 
tariff policies are significant challenges for PRC and EAEU countries, while EU exporter might not be 
prepared to deal with changes that depend so much on authoritarian procedures in these countries. 
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Figure 6. Evaluation of logistics and transport related challenges in China, EU and transit countries 
(1 – not important, 7 – extremely important)35 
 
 
Furthermore, in the expert interviews conducted, the following factors were named as important for 
increasing investment attractiveness of OBOR-related projects in the future: 
• Integration initiatives of hard (e.g., trains, railway terminals, wagons, etc.) and soft (i.e., 
technologies, standards, development strategies, etc.) infrastructure components in the EU, EUAU, 
and China – also as a prerequisite for the sustainable corridor development; 
• Improved international coordination of land transport corridors and associated projects, including 
coordination of investment policies of the countries involved; 
• Increasing transit potential through the development of new business models and utilization of 
available train capacity of different integrators. Development and implementation of integrative 
common projects (e.g. XL-train - enlargement of the length of cargo trains, efficient utilization of 
fitting platforms for cargo trains, etc.); 
• Stable and sustainable tariff system, potential improvement suggestion, e.g., establishment of a 
fixed infrastructure tariff for basic railway services for a period of at least three years; 
• Decreasing unit costs for transport, e.g. through reduction of the wagon component and the 
possibility of a reduction in the complex transport rate; 
• Increasing the West-East loading factor (e.g., expected return load factor is increasing: 55% in 
2017 and 60% in 2018); 
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• As there is currently limited transit cross-border potential in some directions (e.g. Poland), 
increasing transit potential by developing of new routes (e.g. via the Kaliningrad region). 
Furthermore, raising awareness among potential stakeholders and investors, especially from the EU 
member states (e.g., EU goods shippers, consignors and consignee) of EU-EAEU-China land based 
transit projects, the OBOR initiative in general, and the real current capabilities of the EU-China land-
based (here: mainly railway) transit routes and options. 
Figure 7. Estimation of the standard TEU container shipment from China (e.g. Chongqing) to Western 
Europe (e.g. Duisburg, Germany)36 
 
 
The figure above shows the assessment of different transport modes (here: air, maritime and, railway) 
in terms of costs and duration of a standard TEU container from China to Western Europe. A 
breakdown of the results (here: responders’ estimations) demonstrated a considerable knowledge 
and experience gap between experts involved in EU-China overland transport (e.g., integrators, 
railway terminals operators) and non-involved experts (e.g. seaport operators, consignors, etc.). The 
analysis provides empirical evidence, that non-involved potential stakeholders evaluate capacity of 
the EU-China overland transit route as cost-intensive and relatively slow. Correspondingly, according 
to non-expert evaluation, the railway-mode should not be considered as an object for potential 
investments, as it costs considerably more than e.g., sea-borne transport with approximately the same 
transport duration time.  
Thus, to increase the investment attractiveness of OBOR-related projects, among other things, a 
targeted marketing campaign will be started aimed at raising awareness of the OBOR initiative in 
general and the real capacities and potential of EU–China overland transit in particular. 
 
                                                          
36based on own empirical data, collected in the period September-January 2017 
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Annex  
Evaluation (linear regression analysis) of the most important factors relevant to investment in the 
OBOR initiative37 
 
Transport 
corridor 
perspective 
Transport 
corridor 
perspective 
Invest in 2025 Invest in 2040 
China EU 
transit 
countries China EU 
transit 
countries 
Your organization operations can be 
mainly described as 
.809** -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 
What country are you currently 
working for 
-0.561 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.487 
Quality of logistics infrastructure 0 .873** .873** .873** .873** .873** .873** 
Quality of trade infrastructure -.783* -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 
Ease of arranging shipment -0.439 -.808* -.808* -.808* -.808* -.808* -.808* 
Match of expected and factual 
shipment dates 
0 .866** .866** .866** .866** .866** .866** 
Ability to track the shipment -.678* -0.424 -0.424 -0.424 -0.424 -0.424 -0.424 
Transport personnel competence -0.289 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 
Logistics personnel competence -.771* 0.535 0.535 0.535 0.535 0.535 0.535 
Trade personnel competence -.814** 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 
Government personnel competence 0.183 .772* .772* .772* .772* .772* .772* 
Environmental friendliness 0.513 .731* .731* .731* .731* .731* .731* 
Ease of customs procedures -0.085 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606 
Quality of institutions -0.213 .882** .882** .882** .882** .882** .882** 
Quality of government regulation 0.151 .756* .756* .756* .756* .756* .756* 
Government personnel competence -0.039 .673* .673* .673* .673* .673* .673* 
Environmental friendliness 0.034 .693* .693* .693* .693* .693* .693* 
Ease of customs procedures -0.335 .742* .742* .742* .742* .742* .742* 
Quality of government regulation 0.28 .742* .742* .742* .742* .742* .742* 
Efficiency of customs 0.579 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.559 
Quality of transport infrastructure .781* 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.419 
Ease of arranging shipment .734* 0.507 0.507 0.507 0.507 0.507 0.507 
Match of expected and factual 
shipment dates 
.734* 0.507 0.507 0.507 0.507 0.507 0.507 
Logistics personnel competence 0.096 0.545 0.545 0.545 0.545 0.545 0.545 
Trade personnel competence -0.302 .756* .756* .756* .756* .756* .756* 
Government personnel competence 0.539 .763* .763* .763* .763* .763* .763* 
Environmental friendliness .668* 0.519 0.519 0.519 0.519 0.519 0.519 
Ease of customs procedures .723* 0.601 0.601 0.601 0.601 0.601 0.601 
Quality of institutions 0.376 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.608 
Quality of government regulation 0.62 0.523 0.523 0.523 0.523 0.523 0.523 
                                                          
37 based on own empirical data, collected in the period September 2017-January 2018 
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Inadequacy of roads to international 
quality standards 
-0.399 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
Specific regulations within bilateral or 
other intergovernmental agreements 
0.609 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.419 0.419 
Restrictions on route choice .740* 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 
Information technologies regulations .795* 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 
Difference in technology development .781* 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 
Transport tariffs -0.592 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 0.378 
Insufficient harmonized procedures at 
border crossing 
0.098 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 
Duration of customs and border 
clearance 
0.031 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.459 
Quoting 0.192 .785* .785* .785* .785* .785* .785* 
Difference in technology development 0.482 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Governmental procedures 0.047 .670* .670* .670* .670* .670* .670* 
Existing mechanisms of administrative 
support 
0.446 .719* .719* .719* .719* .719* .719* 
Tariff policy -0.15 0.457 0.457 0.457 0.457 0.457 0.457 
Implementation of changes in 
shipment 
0.125 .713* .713* .713* .713* .713* .713* 
Discrepancy of the requirement 0.24 -0.158 -0.158 -0.158 -0.158 -0.158 -0.158 
Lack of safe and high-quality transport 
infrastructure 
-0.541 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 
Lack of safe and high-quality logistics 
infrastructure 
-0.395 -0.204 -0.204 -0.204 -0.204 -0.204 -0.204 
Lack of safe and high-quality trade 
infrastructure 
-0.447 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 
Difference in gauges -0.179 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Quoting .752* 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 
Restrictions on route choice .756* 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.338 0.338 
Information technologies regulations 0.664 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.355 
Difference in technology development .718* 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 
Existing mechanisms of administrative 
support 
0.38 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
Transport tariffs -0.593 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 -0.173 
Implementation of changes in 
shipment 
0.573 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.243 
Warehousing/transloading charges -0.57 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 
Rail infrastructure 0 .686* .686* .686* .686* .686* .686* 
Pipeline infrastructure 0.167 .706* .706* .706* .706* .706* .706* 
Road transport service providers -0.467 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.516 
Pipeline transport service providers 0.232 .770* .770* .770* .770* .770* .770* 
Sanitary inspection agencies 0.178 .707* .707* .707* .707* .707* .707* 
Related non-profits 0.2 .743* .743* .743* .743* .743* .743* 
Airport charges -0.038 .830** .830** .830** .830** .830** .830** 
Road charges 0.204 .703* .703* .703* .703* .703* .703* 
Rail charges 0.096 .906** .906** .906** .906** .906** .906** 
Pipeline charges -0.065 .954** .954** .954** .954** .954** .954** 
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Warehousing/transloading charges 0.221 .855** .855** .855** .855** .855** .855** 
Agent fees 0.156 .803** .803** .803** .803** .803** .803** 
Pipeline transport service providers -0.033 .982** .982** .982** .982** .982** .982** 
Road charges -.711* 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 
Pipeline charges -0.16 .721* .721* .721* .721* .721* .721* 
Import shipments are delivered as 
scheduled 
-0.138 -0.617 -0.617 -0.617 -0.617 -0.617 -0.617 
Export shipments are delivered as 
scheduled 
-0.195 -0.637 -0.637 -0.637 -0.637 -0.637 -0.637 
Importing procedures are transparent -0.234 -0.619 -0.619 -0.619 -0.619 -0.619 -0.619 
Exporting procedures are transparent -0.163 -0.608 -0.608 -0.608 -0.608 -0.608 -0.608 
Regulation changes are implemented 
efficiently 
0 -0.535 -0.535 -0.535 -0.535 -0.535 -0.535 
Traders demonstrate high level of 
compliance 
-0.085 -0.567 -0.567 -0.567 -0.567 -0.567 -0.567 
Policy recommendations are taken 
into consideration 
-0.362 -0.524 -0.524 -0.524 -0.524 -0.524 -0.524 
Major delays in pre-shipment -0.458 -0.552 -0.552 -0.552 -0.552 -0.552 -0.552 
Customs procedures are transparent -0.121 -0.504 -0.504 -0.504 -0.504 -0.504 -0.504 
Importing procedures are transparent -0.348 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 
Exporting procedures are transparent -0.348 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 
Regulation changes are implemented 
efficiently 
-0.221 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 
Traders demonstrate high level of 
compliance 
-0.151 -0.583 -0.583 -0.583 -0.583 -0.583 -0.583 
Policy recommendations are taken 
into consideration 
-0.264 -0.607 -0.607 -0.607 -0.607 -0.607 -0.607 
Major delays in warehousing and 
transloading 
-0.522 -0.433 -0.433 -0.433 -0.433 -0.433 -0.433 
Major delays in pre-shipment -.735* -0.406 -0.406 -0.406 -0.406 -0.406 -0.406 
Customs procedures are transparent -0.271 -0.575 -0.575 -0.575 -0.575 -0.575 -0.575 
Regulation changes are implemented 
efficiently 
0.516 -0.339 -0.339 -0.339 -0.339 -0.339 -0.339 
Traders demonstrate high level of 
compliance 
0.296 -0.459 -0.459 -0.459 -0.459 -0.459 -0.459 
Customs procedures are transparent 0.598 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 -0.267 
How many government agencies you 
usually deal with in EU-China transit 
countries: 
-0.359 -0.535 -0.535 -0.535 -0.535 -0.535 -0.535 
How many forms do you usually 
submit per action in EU-China 
transit countries: 
-0.561 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 
What share of procedures (%) can be 
done electronically in China 
-0.338 -0.567 -0.567 -0.567 -0.567 -0.567 -0.567 
What share of procedures (%) can be 
done electronically in EU 
-0.116 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 
What share of procedures (%) can be 
done electronically in EU-China transit 
countries 
.878** -0.218 -0.218 -0.218 -0.218 -0.218 -0.218 
*significant at 0.05 
**significant at 0.01 
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